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Inhibiting Patent Trolling:
A New Approach for Applying Rule 11
By Eric Rogers & Young Jeon*
There has been an alarming rise in the number of litigious entities—commonly referred
to as patent trolls or non-practicing entities—that make no products but file dubious
patent infringement lawsuits merely to extract money from commercially productive
companies. High litigation costs provide a fertile environment for an exploitive business
model that uses shotgun tactics to threaten patent infringement claims against numerous
companies, many of which will make a purely financial decision to pay patent trolls
rather than expend even more money in litigation. Sometimes the payoff is a settlement
strategically set below the likely cost of litigation defense. Other times, the payoff is a
license fee too small to justify expending litigation costs to adjudicate, even if it is likely a
frivolous claim.
Patent infringement claims asserted by patent trolls are a type of nuisance lawsuit—a
lawsuit in which the defendant pays to make the lawsuit go away simply to avoid
expending the considerable costs associated with litigation, not because the lawsuit has
any significant merit or chance of success. While nuisance lawsuits are not new, the
direct, focused, and widespread negative effects of nuisance patent lawsuits on
innovation and productive entities by those neither innovating nor producing anything
make these lawsuits particularly damaging to society. In addition, the public’s negative
perception of patent trolls filing baseless patent infringement claims endangers the
legitimacy of the patent system as a whole. Most people agree something must be done,
but there is little agreement on any specific solution, approach, or strategy.
Yet one need only look to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for a suitable remedy to
help curb this vexing problem. This Article proposes a specialized implementation of
Rule 11 to combat some of the unique difficulties created by the patent-trolling business
model. A Rule 11-based solution is not only preferable to new legislation, but also
complementary because it is 1) immediately available without any legislative action, 2)
flexible enough to handle evolving behavior that exploits patent litigation inefficiencies
through bad-faith patent infringement claims, and 3) strong enough to deter variations of
patent-trolling behavior—whether conducted by a traditional patent troll, NPE, PAE, or
even a commercially active entity. Broadly stated, this approach identifies patenttrolling-predisposed claimants before the accretion of discovery costs and provides a
swifter litigation exit ramp. The proposed inquiry treats all NPEs the same and analyzes
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objective indicia as proxies for ascertaining the intent behind the entity’s litigious
conduct. In sum, an upfront application of Rule 11 provides a less expensive escape route
to end the most readily detectable patent infringement nuisance lawsuits.
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INTRODUCTION
¶1

There has been an alarming rise in the number of litigious entities—commonly
referred to as patent trolls or non-practicing entities (NPEs)—that make no products but
file dubious patent infringement lawsuits merely to extract money from commercially
productive companies.1 High litigation costs provide a fertile environment for an
exploitive business model that uses shotgun tactics to threaten patent infringement claims
against numerous companies, many of which will make a purely financial decision to pay
the patent troll rather than expend even more money in litigation. Sometimes the payoff
is a settlement strategically set below the likely cost of litigation defense. Other times, the

1

See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“An
industry has developed in which firms use patents . . . primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”); EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION (2013) [hereinafter PATENT
ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION REPORT], available at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
docs/patent_report.pdf (“Suits brought by PAEs have tripled in just the last two years, rising from 29
percent of all infringement suits to 62 percent of all infringement suits.”); RPX CORP., 2012 NPE ACTIVITY
REPORT 12 (2013) [hereinafter RPX CORP. REPORT], available at http://www.rpxcorp.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/0BF995E82CFF591EE80EFE8AC69259E7.pdf (“In 2012, for the first time, NPE
cases filed accounted for the majority of all patent infringement cases filed. The NPE share of cases filed
has more than doubled since 2008. A substantial portion of the increase occurred after the enactment of the
[America Invents Act] and likely reflects a disproportionate effect of the [law’s] joinder rule on NPE cases
filed.”); NPEs Have Broader Impact than GAO Headlines Suggest, RPX BLOG (Sept. 9, 2013) [hereinafter
RPX BLOG], http://www.rpxcorp.com/NPEs-Have-Broader-Impact-Than-GAO-Headlines-Suggest;
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2012 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY, http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensicservices/publications/2012-patent-litigation-study.jhtml (last accessed Dec. 10, 2013) [hereinafter 2012
PATENT LITIGATION STUDY]; see also James Bessen, Jennifer Ford, & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and
Social Costs of Patent Trolls, 34 REGULATION 26, 26–27 (2011–12) [hereinafter Bessen, The Private and
Social Costs of Patent Trolls) (discussing how patent troll litigation makes up majority of total patent
lawsuits filed); Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the
Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1608–11 (2009) (reporting that non-practicing
entities own the majority of the most litigated patents); Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent
Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U.
PA. L. REV. 1309 (2013).
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payoff is a license fee too small to justify expending litigation costs to adjudicate, even if
it is likely a frivolous claim.
This exploitive business model, and patent infringement lawsuits brought by patent
trolls generally, are facing increasing criticism.2 Complaints come from various corners,
including small businesses, politicians, and lobbyists representing major corporations.3
One of the main concerns with the rise of patent-troll lawsuits is the overall economic
waste associated with this type of patent litigation.4 More importantly, patent trolling can
needlessly increase the costs of using patented technologies and thus restrain the
practicing of patented technologies.5 This contradicts the fundamental goal of the U.S.
patent system—promoting technological innovation for society’s benefit.6
During congressional discussion of proposed legislation, Representative DeFazio
cited a study that concluded, “[P]atent troll suits cost American technology companies
over $29 billion in 2011 alone.”7 President Obama decried patent trolls, saying they

2
See Randall R. Rader, Colleen V. Chien, & David Hricik, Op-Ed., Make Patent Trolls Pay in Court,
N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2013) [hereinafter Rader Op-Ed.], http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/makepatent-trolls-pay-in-court.html (“The onslaught of litigation brought by ‘patent trolls’—who typically buy
up a slew of patents, then sue anyone and everyone who might be using or selling the claimed inventions—
has slowed the development of new products, increased costs for businesses and consumers, and clogged
our judicial system.”); This American Life: When Patents Attack!, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 22, 2011)
(downloaded using iTunes).
3
See Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461, 483–85 (2014).
4
See John A. Amster, The Patent Troll Toll, INTELLECTUAL PROP. MAG., June 2013, at 34, available at
http://www.rpxcorp.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/The-Patent-Troll-Toll.pdf (“On average, defendants
stay in the case for less than 12 months before settling. This only reinforces the notion that, for all intents
and purposes, these cases are transfers of value between patent users and patent owners. Using the legal
system to make that transfer—and incur 50% of transaction costs—makes the tax on innovation far more
burdensome than it needs to be.”).
5
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 67–68 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/evolving-ipmarketplace-aligning-patent-notice-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade.
6
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
7
See James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
387, 412–13 (2014) [hereinafter Bessen, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes] (“Over a decade, the
amount of NPE litigation has grown from less than 5% of all U.S. patent litigation to over 60%.”).
However, an increase in the number of patent litigations by NPEs can be explained by the implementation
of the America Invents Act changes to Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in September 2011.
See RPX CORP. REPORT, supra note 1. The new procedural rule for joining defendants in patent litigation
was designed to prevent patent trolls from suing dozens of defendants in the same case where there is no
commonality between complaints other than the allegedly infringed patent. Thus, a status quo for the
number of defendants in patent trolling litigation can now be better represented from the increase of
independent cases. See id.; see also Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan, & David L. Schwartz, NPE
Patent Data Project, NPE DATA, npedata.com (last visited Dec. 10, 2013) (“[W]e find that most
differences between the years—an increase in the number of patent holding companies and individual
inventor suits—is likely explained by a change in the joinder rules adopted in 2011 as part of the America
Invents Act.”); David Schwartz & Jay Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent
System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 433 (2014) (arguing that Bessen and Meurer’s study was fundamentally
flawed because their definition of patent trolls included individual inventors, universities, and entities
intending to practice their patent(s) in the future); Mark Summerfield, A $29 Billion US Troll-Tax or Just
Another Statistical Smokescreen?, PATENTOLOGY BLOG (June 29, 2012, 1:52 AM),
http://blog.patentology.com.au/2012/06/29-billion-us-troll-tax-or-just-another.html; Do NPE’s “Cost” Us
$29 B? Intellectual Ventures Co-Founder Peter Detkin Sets the Record Straight, GAMETIME IP (last
updated July 17, 2012, 5:43 PM), http://gametimeip.com/2012/06/28/do-npes-cost-us-29-b-intellectualventures-co-founder-peter-detkin-sets-the-record-straight/.
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“essentially leverage and hijack somebody else’s idea and see if they can extort some
money out of them.”8 The potential drag on the economy caused by the widespread use of
the patent-troll business model has led Congress to consider new legislation that
implements a one-way, “loser-pays” system for patent litigation. This system would
require each NPE claimant to post bond for the full cost of defending a lawsuit before
trial, and if a court finds that no infringement occurred, the NPE pays the defendant’s full
legal costs.9
Patent infringement claims asserted by patent trolls are a type of nuisance
lawsuit—a lawsuit in which the defendant pays to make the lawsuit go away simply to
avoid expending the considerable costs associated with litigation, not because the lawsuit
has any significant merit or chance of success.10 While nuisance lawsuits are not new, the
direct, focused, and widespread negative effects of nuisance patent lawsuits on
innovation and productive entities by those neither innovating nor producing anything
make these lawsuits particularly damaging to society. In addition, the public’s negative
perception of patent trolls filing baseless patent infringement claims endangers the
legitimacy of the patent system as a whole. Most people agree something must be done,11
but there is little agreement on any specific solution, approach, or strategy.12
Yet one need only look to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) for a
suitable remedy to help curb this vexing problem. One purpose of the FRCP’s Rule 11
(Rule 11) is to discourage abusive litigation tactics.13 This Article proposes a specialized
implementation of Rule 11 to combat some of the unique problems created by the patenttrolling business model. A Rule 11-based solution is not only preferable to new
legislation, but also complementary because it is 1) immediately available without any
legislative action, 2) flexible enough to handle evolving behaviors that exploit patent
litigation by using bad-faith patent infringement claims, and 3) strong enough to deter
variations of patent-trolling behavior—whether conducted by a traditional patent troll or
less predatory entity.
Part I of this Article clarifies the patent-trolling business model and analyzes the
unique ways patent trolls can manipulate patent litigation, settlements, and patent
licensing. Part II explains the predominant proposals and tactics recently offered to
inhibit patent trolling, which this Article predicts to be ineffective and/or indirectly
weaken the patent system overall. Part III explains the current doctrine for imposing Rule
11 sanctions for patent infringement claims. Part IV proposes a new implementation of
8

PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
H.R. 845, 113th Cong. § 285A(a)(b) (2013) (leaving the bond amount to be determined by the court on
a case-by-case basis).
10
The nuisance lawsuit problem is not new. Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American
Patent Thicket: The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 183–84 (2010) (noting that
since the early 1850s, individual inventors have complained about corporations that refuse to pay fair
license fees for their inventive works); see Matthew B. Wills & Neil Gold, Attorneys’ Fees in Litigation:
Time to Discard the American Rule?, 4 LITIG. 31, 31 (1978) (“[N]uisance law suits are at the heart of the
medical malpractice insurance crisis.”).
11
See Matt Levy, Patent Progress’s Guide to Patent Reform Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS (Mar. 4,
2014), http://www.patentprogress.org/2013/10/23/patent-progresss-guide-to-patent-reform-legislation/.
12
See Improving the Patent System to Promote American Innovation and Competitiveness: Hearing on
H.R. 3309 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte,
Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
13
FDIC v. Maxxam, Inc., 523 F.3d 566, 586 (5th Cir. 2008).
9
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Rule 11 to help immediately alleviate the problems caused by patent trolling through a
mechanism that identifies patent-trolling-predisposed claimants and delays the accretion
of discovery costs. The proposed inquiry treats all NPEs the same and analyzes objective
indicia as proxies for ascertaining the intent behind an entity’s litigious conduct. This
Article proposes an upfront application of Rule 11 as a less expensive escape route to end
the most readily detectable patent infringement nuisance lawsuits.
I. NUISANCE PATENT INFRINGEMENT THREATS:
PATENT TROLLS AND PATENT TROLLING
¶7

¶8

The prominence of intellectual property in the economy and its importance to
businesses has dramatically increased over the past few decades. Similarly, this period
has seen a rapid increase in the quantity of technological innovation across multiple
industries, especially patented technologies related to products and services. Along with
the rising prevalence, quantity, and value of patents, there has been a concomitant rise in
rent seeking through the misuse of patent rights by entities pejoratively referred to as
“patent trolls.” Patent trolls never plan to commercialize or practice their patents. Instead,
patent trolls wait for others to commercialize technologies related to their patents so that
they can later attempt to coerce the actual users of technology into exploitative license
agreements or lawsuit settlements at exorbitant prices.
Various factors have led to the proliferation of patent trolling. For instance, many
point to 1) a lack of demand for products in a faltering economy; 2) an increase in the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO) practice of issuing weak patents from the
late 1990s until KSR v. Teleflex;14 and/or 3) the explosion of patenting computer-related
business methods, such as “software patents,” and the subsequent growth in e-commerce
applications following the State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group
decision.15 In addition, some suggest that an inherently litigation-averse corporate culture
has contributed to the rise of patent trolling, with company leadership favoring relatively
inexpensive payoffs to avoid costly and unpredictable litigation.16
14

See Bessen, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, supra note 7; see, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex,
Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008); DAN L. BURK & MARK A.
LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH
LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING
INNOVATION AND PROGRESS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE
NAT’L ACADEMIES, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin, &
Mark B. Myers, eds., 2004), available at www.nap.edu/html/patentsystem/0309089107.pdf.
15
John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants (Stanford L. and
Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 398, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1677785; see State Street
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-465, ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT
LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY (2013) [hereinafter GAO Report]. After the State
Street decision, software patenting jumped from 1,000 patents per year to 2,500 patents per year. See GAO
Report, supra note 15. In more detail, the GAO Report found that by 2011, a majority of patents were
software-related. Id. Also, from 2007 to 2011, the number of patent infringement lawsuits significantly
increased. Id. For instance, just from 2010 to 2011, lawsuits increased 31 percent. Id. Further, between
2007 and 2011, the number of defendants increased by 129 percent, 89 percent of which were softwarerelated patents. Id.
16
Hon. Randall R. Rader, C.J., Fed. Cir., Address at the 27th Annual Intellectual Property Law
Conference: E-Discovery in Patent Litigation—A Model Order to Quiet the Tail that Wags the Dog (Mar.
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Patents can create value for their owners in many ways. Patent holders have the
right to 1) monopolize markets by practicing their inventions while excluding others from
doing so; 2) license their patent rights for remuneration; and 3) build a large patent
portfolio as a defensive strategy to prevent patent litigation and to gain greater freedom.
The first two ways are by far the most commonly exercised and involve the direct
application of the patented technology in society. These strategies produce value based
on real commercial markets for products and services. Monopolization allows the patent
rights holder to use supra-competitive pricing in the marketplace; however, this pricing is
constrained by economic factors such that other goods or services can become substitutes
if the price exceeds an optimal market value. Similarly, the remuneration terms of
licensing agreements often relate to the commercial value of the technology. And the
defensive strategy gives the patent rights holder the option to assert patent infringement
counterclaims when others assert patents against them, which both deters patent lawsuits
and encourages cross-licensing arrangements between competitors.
¶10
In contrast, patent trolling is a type of patent monetization that relies solely on
patent infringement litigation, or at least the threat of litigation, to create value for a
patent holder.17 A patent-trolling business model creates value by leveraging the threat
and cost of patent infringement lawsuits to obtain settlements and license fees.18 In the
United States, the default rule (the American Rule) is that each party pays its own legal
fees, which encourages more nuisance lawsuits and quick settlements before litigation
costs substantially accrue.19 In sum, patent infringement lawsuits filed by patent-trolling
entities are a type of nuisance lawsuit in which the accused infringer is often financially
compelled to pay to make the lawsuit go away just to avoid exorbitant litigation costs, not
because the claim has much merit or chance of success.20
A. The Patent-Trolling Problem
¶11

Patent trolls are a type of patent-asserting entity (PAE) typically classified as NPEs
and/or patent aggregators.21 Many characterize the patent-trolling business model as
2012) [hereinafter Rader Address to AIPLC].
17
A famous example of a patent infringement nuisance lawsuit is a non-practicing entity’s use of the
Lemelson patents for barcode scanners to threaten hundreds of companies with litigation, eventually
resulting in over $1 billion in license fees for the NPE. See Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. &
Research Found., 301 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (D. Nev. 2004), aff'd, Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med.,
Educ. & Research Found., 422 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005), amended on reh'g in part sub nom. Symbol
Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., LP, 429 F.3d 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
18
“Patent holders frequently assert that another party is using a patented invention, and for a fee, offer to
grant a license for such use. . . . [P]arties receiving such licensing letters have a strong incentive to pay up
even if they believe they are not engaged in infringement.” 150 CONG. REC. E1935 (daily ed. Oct. 11,
2004) [hereinafter Rep. Berman statement] (statement of Rep. Berman).
19
One exception to this default rule is that federal appellate courts may impose that the losing party pay
the prevailing party for damages caused by frivolous litigation under 28 U.S.C. § 1912.
20
See generally Ranganath Sudarshan, Nuisance-Value Patent Suits: An Economic Model and Proposal,
25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159 (2008).
21
“In 2001, Peter Detkin, then vice president and general counsel at Intel Corporation, stated that a
‘patent troll is somebody who tries to make a lot of money off a patent that they are not practicing and have
no intention of practicing and in most cases never practiced.’” Shaun McVicar et al., “Who’s that Walking
on My Bridge?”: Navigating ‘Patent Troll’ Activity in the UK and Australia, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 31, 2014),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=56d0d62a-7656-42ec-a14f-cd38e7f5aaff. See, e.g., ACACIA
RESEARCH CORP., http://acaciaresearch.com/about-us/#history (last visited Oct. 13, 2014) (“Acacia and our
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simply another form of rent seeking. Patent trolls often collect never-practiced, neverlicensed, or never-asserted patents in order to assert claims against established businesses
that might have been unknowingly infringing those patents for years.22 In many instances,
the patents are overly broad and thus invalid to some extent, if not in their entirety, or the
patents do not cover the allegedly infringing activity. Nonetheless, even if a targeted
business believes that the patent infringement claim lacks merit, they often choose not to
litigate and settle for paying a patent licensing fee because litigation costs are
prohibitively expensive. In other words, the mere threat of patent infringement litigation
is the patent troll’s most effective weapon in this exploitive, rent-seeking business model.
¶12
A patent-trolling strategy’s success largely derives from the high legal costs
associated with defending against a patent infringement claim, even if simply to get the
claim dismissed at the summary judgment stage. Patent litigation has become one of the
most expensive and time-consuming types of commercial litigation, which further
amplifies the pressure to settle or pay a licensing fee.23 This increasing cost drives the
growing popularity of the patent-trolling business model, and makes patent infringement
lawsuits one of the most lucrative forms of modern nuisance lawsuits. Moreover, the
average cost of patent right acquisition and assertion is far less than the average cost of
defending against patent infringement claims, further incentivizing entities—often funded
by recirculated revenue from previous rounds of patent trolling—to actively search for
and purchase patents for patent trolling purposes. Lastly, the large quantity of unused,
overly broad patents; the notice-pleading rule; and the default American Rule have
created an environment for patent trolling to flourish.24
¶13
The U.S. legal system generally disfavors a cost-shifting scheme based on who
wins a civil suit.25 However, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (the Patent Statute) provides cost shifting
for “exceptional” cases where the court may order the patent infringement claimant to
pay the prevailing party’s legal fees.26 But this harsh penalty has been used only

patent partners have signed more than 1,200 licensing agreements with many of the world’s largest
companies.”); CONVERSANT INTELLECTUAL PROP. MGMT. INC., http://www.conversantip.com/ourportfolio/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2014) (maintaining over “12,000 patents and applications under
management” at the entity formerly known as Mosaid Technologies); INTELLECTUAL VENTURES MGMT.,
LLC, FACT SHEET (2014), available at http://www.intellectualventures.com/assets_docs/IV_Corporate_
Fact_Sheet_Sep2014.pdf (“With more than $6 billion committed capital and more than 40,000 IP assets in
active monetization programs, we own one of the world’s largest and fastest growing intellectual property
portfolios . . . .”); ROUND ROCK RESEARCH LLC, http://www.roundrockresearch.com/ (last visited Oct. 13,
2014); see also Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2012).
22
See Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1590 (2009).
23
See Bessen, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, supra note 7.
24
See Stanley Clark, The Risks and Costs of Patent Litigation: A House Counsel’s View, 315 UTAH L.
REV. 618, 618 (1973) (discussing “the protracted nature, enormous risks and the inordinately high costs of
patent litigation”).
25
See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 31 DUKE
L.J. 651, 652 (1982). See generally Philip M. Payne, Costs in Common Law Actions in the Federal Courts,
21 VA. L. REV. 397 (1935).
26
35 U.S.C. § 285 (stating attorney’s fees may be awarded for “vexatious or unjustified litigation or
frivolous suit”). The purpose of the “exceptional” case statute has been described as compensation to the
prevailing party for its legal costs. See Cent. Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
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sparingly, and judicial precedent has defined the contours of what constitutes an
exceptional case narrowly.27
¶14
Even if a business suspects that the lawsuit is baseless, justifying unpredictable
litigation costs is difficult when parties can so easily eliminate this threat by paying the
patent troll a sum far less than the cost of successfully defending the lawsuit. Often, the
commercial value of a patent does not correspond with the dollar amount of settlements
or license fees because exorbitant legal costs distort the patent’s actual value.
Consequently, the cost of litigation can dictate settlement amounts and license fees
instead of traditional marketplace economics related to the value of the patent.28 Thus,
some patent license fees represent an economic inefficiency as compared to their actual
commercial value—creating significant, legally created, deadweight loss in the
economy.29
¶15
When a business encounters the threat of patent litigation, it has three main choices
besides ceasing the allegedly infringing activities: 1) design around the threatened patent
claim(s); 2) negotiate and obtain a patent license; or 3) litigate hoping the court will find
the threatened patent invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed. Litigation is often
undesirable because of high legal costs, uncertainty associated with construing patent
claims, unpredictability of jury verdicts, and potentially negative effects on share prices.30
In addition, deciding to design around a possibly invalid patent may not be wise because
of considerable research costs, the uncertainty regarding a successful design-around,
and/or the interruption of business operations during an indeterminate period.31 That
leaves the quick and easy choice—pay the license fee and continue with business as
normal. In other words, if the patent infringement claim is seemingly dubious, and the
license or settlement fee is strategically set below the cost of litigation, then a company is
likely facing a patent-troll “shakedown” fee.32
¶16
Based on the current patent litigation system, it is often economically efficient to
settle some patent lawsuits as quickly as possible to avoid legal costs. Litigation expenses
average nearly $5.5 million for cases with more than $25 million at risk, and $650,000
for cases with less than $1 million at risk.33 It can cost over $3 million and take eighteen
27

Since the creation of the statutory “exceptional” patent case in 1952, there have been about 3,300
cases that cite the “exceptional case” statute. Westlaw search, WESTLAW, https://a.next.westlaw.com
(search “35 U.S.C. § 285”; then click the “citing references” tab; then click the “cases” tab) (last searched
Aug. 18, 2014). Of these, 2,409 cases were at the district court level, 858 cases were heard before the
Federal Circuit, and 15 cases were heard before the Supreme Court of the United States. Id.
28
See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 87–89 (2005).
29
John Johnson, Gregory K. Leonard, Christine Meyer, & Ken Serwin, Don’t Feed the Trolls, 52 LES
NOUVELLES 3, 487–95 (2007).
30
See Anna Mayergoyz, Lessons from Europe on How to Tame U.S. Patent Trolls, 42 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 241 (2009) (noting that about 50% of all appealed patent litigation decisions are reversed). In the short
term, defending a patent infringement suit can cause stock prices to drop. See Bessen, The Private and
Social Costs of Patent Trolls, supra note 1, at 30 (estimating the median decline in common stock value of
defendant corporations in patent infringement suits brought by NPEs at $20.4 million).
31
Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007);
John M. Golden, Patent Trolls and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111 (2007).
32
See Tina M. Nguyen, Lowering the Fare: Reducing the Patent Troll’s Ability to Tax the Patent
System, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 101, 114 (2012).
33
AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011 I-153-56 (reporting
median litigation costs for patent infringement lawsuits as follows: when less than $1 million was at risk,
$350,000 and $650,000; when more than $1 million but less than $25 million was at risk, $1.5 million and
$2.5 million; and when more than $25 million was at risk, $3 million and $5.5 million, through the
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months just to proceed to the claim construction and discovery phases to reach summary
judgment.34 These litigation realities afford any patent rights holder the opportunity to
use threats of patent infringement as a “scare tactic to obtain unwarranted licenses and
settlements”35—something akin to blackmail, extortion, and a Mafioso-style
“shakedown.”
¶17
This economic reality allows for a patent-trolling business model wherein PAEs
use patents solely for rent seeking via nuisance lawsuits. PAEs search to acquire patents
wholesale or in bankruptcy auctions, and often target commercial activity only
superficially related to the subject matter of the patents. In addition, the cost of bringing a
lawsuit is often minimal because a patent troll can make money by merely threatening
potential defendants with cease-and-desist letters.36 This allows patent trolls to perform
an efficient first-pass screen by “fishing” with identical letters to all the companies active
in a particular product market, many of which will pay license fees without the PAE ever
having to file a complaint.37 Additionally, these legal economies-of-scale continue to
exist after the first-pass screen, as seen when a PAE files nearly identical complaints
against successive defendants without any additional work.
¶18
The patent-trolling problem creates economic deadweight loss, taxes technology
users with transaction costs, and perhaps, impedes the spread and development of
technology at large.38 Further, patent trolling unnecessarily harasses members of the
business community. Moreover, when any entity asserts a frivolous patent infringement
claim without a bona fide belief that the claim has legal merit, it hinders judicial
economy, interferes with fair competition, distorts the purpose of patent litigation, and
lowers public opinion of the legal system and profession.39
B. Defining the Patent Troll
¶19

A patent troll can loosely be defined as a bad-faith legal actor that seeks a payoff
by threatening patent infringement lawsuits against product-manufacturing entities. A
patent troll does not practice, or in many instances does not even have the means to
discovery phases and final disposition respectively); see, e.g., Mayergoyz, supra note 30.
34
Abusive Patent Litigation: The Impact on American Innovation and Jobs, and Potential Solutions:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (testimony of John G. Boswell, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, SAS
Inst.) (arguing that the high cost of discovery exacerbates the patent-troll problem, in one instance costing
accused infringers up to $8 million just to get to the summary judgment stage).
35
Nguyen, supra note 32; see Rep. Berman statement, supra note 18.
36
Johnson, supra note 29, at 487 (discussing how extortionary royalty payments “constitute a ‘tax’ that
ultimately leads to less product development and higher prices for consumers”).
37
Jim Spencer, Patent Trolls Collect “Nuisance Fees” and Political Enemies, STAR TRIBUNE (June 15,
2013), http://m.startribune.com/business/?id=211615651. Tim Scobie, Gen. Counsel of Mason Cos. of
Chippewa Falls, Wis. stated, “[w]e are a small organization in a small town” and that “[i]f it’s going to cost
us $25,000 for a license fee or it’s going to cost us $250,000 to fight, don’t even bother asking me.” Id.
38
See Bessen, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, supra note 7, at 400 (“[A] substantial part of the
direct costs of NPE litigation is a deadweight loss to society.”); see also Rader Op-Ed., supra note 2
(“[Patent Trolling] has slowed the development of new products, increased costs for businesses and
consumers, and clogged our judicial system.”).
39
The relative standards of “meritless” or “frivolous” as compared to “objectively unreasonable” or
“low likelihood of success” is difficult to articulate. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10–12, Octane Fitness,
LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014) (No. 12-1184); see Bessen, The Direct Costs
from NPE Disputes, supra note 7, at 389; Spencer, supra note 37.
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practice, its patented technology. Then, if an alleged infringer rejects a cheap licensing
fee, the patent troll indiscriminately sues the infringer, without investigating if grounds
exist to claim infringement, in hopes of obtaining a settlement fee less than the cost of
litigation. However, detailing the exact parameters of what constitutes a patent troll is
problematic because the description above is both over- and under-inclusive. Moreover,
the intent behind offers for license and/or settlement fees is often opaque.
¶20
It is difficult for society to police something that it cannot define.40 Many suggest
that there is no satisfactory definition of a patent troll.41 For instance, some consider
patent-trolling behavior permissible, such as when universities develop proprietary
technologies but do not commercialize the technologies themselves.42 Further, most
definitions of a patent troll are over-inclusive because they often include other types of
NPEs, such as individual inventors, inventive startup companies, failed businesses, and
patent purchasers.43 After examining the patent troll, this Article argues for an approach
that focuses on extortionary patent trolling instead of NPE status, and proposes what
types of conduct are indicative of harmful patent trolling.
¶21
This Article suggests that a “patent troll” is an entity that:
(1) asserts a patent against a product-manufacturing company, while the patent is
not being legally “practiced by anyone, i.e. neither licensed nor practiced by
the owner,”44 and the owner has no intention of ever practicing;45
(2) pursues a business model that aims to acquire overly broad patents to make
profits by threatening lawsuits against anyone that makes products even
remotely related to its patented technologies in order to get favorable license
arrangements and/or settlements;46 and/or
(3) does not plan to initially license or practice the patent it acquires, but rather
hides and waits for potential infringers to come along, using the patent
primarily to obtain high license fees while never practicing the patent.47 In
40

See Tracie L. Bryant, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 25 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 687, 690 (2012); Marc Morgan, Stop Looking Under the Bridge for Imaginary Creatures: A
Comment Examining Who Really Deserves the Title Patent Troll, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 165, 166 (2007); John
T. Funk, In Defense of the Trolls: Part 4 (Final), VIEW FROM THE BRIDGE (July 4, 2006, 9:10 PM),
http://evergreenip.typepad.com/view_ from_bridge/2006/07/in_defense_of_t_1.html.
41
John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2112 n.7 (2007)
(noting the lack of a satisfactory definition for a patent troll).
42
See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
611, 611 (2008) (arguing that universities should not be deemed trolls); see also Michael Risch, Patent
Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 468 (2012) (“[U]niversities are very rarely patent plaintiffs.”).
43
See Spencer, supra note 37 (quoting Rep. Paulsen) (“There is abuse that’s going on . . . the challenge
is to target the abusers in an effective way without casting too wide a net.”); Nguyen, supra note 32, at 103.
44
Eric J. Rogers, Ten Years of Inter Partes Patent Reexamination Appeals: An Empirical View, 29
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 305, 350 n.157 (2013).
45
See Rader Address to AIPLC, supra note 16; Patent Trolls: Unfair Name-Calling, or Threat to
Current Patent System?, 69 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 565 (2005); see also David G.
Barker, Troll or No Troll? Policing Patent Usage with an Open Post-Grant Review, DUKE L. & TECH.
REV., Apr. 2005, at 7.
46
See Funk, supra note 40.
47
Rep. Berman statement, supra note 18, at E1936; see Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Comment, Patent
Investment Trusts: Let's Build a PIT to Catch the Patent Trolls, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 367, 376 (2005);
Mayergoyz, supra note 30. A parallel phenomenon is the trademark troll exemplified by Leo Stoller, who
claimed rights to a large inventory of popular trademarks and attempted to assert those rights. However,
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the alternative, a patent troll may acquire an overly broad patent after
companies have already commercialized the technology and created a mature
market rife with potential infringers, which it then uses primarily to obtain
high settlements fees and/or damage awards.48
¶22

This Article also suggests that the following types of conduct are indicative of
“patent trolling”:
(1) Reasserting the same patent against multiple entities to achieve advantageous
economies-of-scale, whereas defending against patent infringement lawsuits
is usually conducted one defendant at a time.
(2) Not manufacturing or practicing any patents, which means the entity has no
fear of having to (a) defend against a counterclaim, (b) consider crosslicensing arrangements during license negotiations, (c) produce witnesses for
depositions, or (d) expend additional legal costs beyond those associated with
filing complaints and reusing documents and arguments made against
previous defendants.49
(3) Joining multiple defendants with different attributes and locales in the same
patent infringement suit in an effort to promote efficiency and inhibit
transfers of venue.50
(4) Not making any products and thus having no customer base, which shields
the patent troll from public relations problems related to litigation.
(5) Retaining attorneys under contingency-fee agreements, which create nothingto-lose, low-risk scenarios for patent assertion.51

¶23

The characteristics of a typical patent troll make them particularly difficult
opponents in a lawsuit because they create asymmetries with patentees that
commercialize their patented technologies. As noted in the second characteristic listed
above, the typical patent troll does not fear a patent infringement counterclaim because it
does not actively manufacture any products. Thus, the typical patent troll does not have
any of its own products at risk from an injunction. These first two asymmetries prevent
cross-licensing solutions and peace negotiations that are possible among competitors in
most cases. As per the fifth characteristic listed above, the typical patent troll does not
trademark law has a “use” requirement, which makes trademark trolling less feasible. See Mike Masnick, Is
Famed Trademark Troll Leo Stoller Trying to Stealthily Reclaim Bogus Stealth Trademarks?, TECHDIRT
(July 19, 2010, 9:37 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100719/02130110270.shtml.
48
Funk, supra note 40.
49
See, e.g., Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2011). An NPE has far
fewer documents to produce, fewer witnesses, and a much smaller legal bill than a commercially active
company that makes or sells products, or offers services. GAO Report, supra note 15, at 3.
50
Patent trolls use the tactic of joining multiple but unrelated defendants in the same patent infringement
suit to keep the trial in the venue of their choice, typically the Eastern District of Texas. See Bryant, supra
note 40, at 688–89. The America Invents Act of 2011 tried to end this, but consolidation for pretrial
purposes is still available. See, e.g., In re Bear Creek Techs., Inc., 858 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1378 (J.P.M.L.
2012).
51
William R. Towns, U.S. Contingency Fees: A Level Playing Field?, WIPO MAGAZINE (Feb. 2010),
http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2010/01/article_0002.html (“Contingency fee arrangements are
conducive to [patent trolling], as they allow [NPEs] to effectively spread the financial risk involved in
patent litigation by partnering with their lawyers.”).
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fear reputational harm or retribution from the public because it has no customers. And in
reference to the last listed characteristic, patent trolling may be funded by contingencyfee arrangements that create markets for patent litigators to find and bring the most
financially promising lawsuits or settlements, regardless of the patented technologies’
value or the merits of the infringement claims. Thus, contingency-fee-based patent
infringement representation is readily available for patent-trolling entities, whereas there
is no counterpart patent-defense litigator market for defendants because accused
infringers rarely receive large damage payouts and cannot use contingency-fee setups.
These legal asymmetries are typical in patent-trolling cases. As a result, similar to
“gamblers playing with house money—[patent trolls] can win, but cannot lose.”52
C. Who Is Not a Patent Troll?
¶24

Unlike the stereotypical patent troll—a commercially inactive shell company that
purchases a patent as an investment for the sole purpose of threatening enforcement—
universities or inventors that do not practice their patents rarely deserve the patent-troll
label. This is true despite the fact that these parties rarely produce goods and might
threaten commercially active entities with accusations of patent infringement.
¶25
The typical university exhibits many of the hallmark characteristics of a patent
troll. However, while it does not make products of its own, a university can license
without threats of litigation, and rarely relies on patent litigation for revenue.53 This
makes economic sense because a rational, profit-maximizing monopolist who is unable to
bring a technology to market independently should be free to license it to others who can.
¶26
Besides universities, many startups and individuals can invent something so
revolutionary that it threatens established companies and requires widespread litigation to
protect. These startups or individual inventors may choose to grant licenses to more
established companies for a modest return, or they may choose to exclude others,
including established companies, while bringing the invention to market. In either
scenario, the established companies would likely fight back by raising barriers to market
entry, such that the most promising battleground for startups and lesser-funded entities
might be in court.54 However, once in litigation, a startup or lesser-funded entity often
finds itself up against a well-prepared litigation machine with a well-funded war chest.
Thus, a research university, individual inventor, or startup company that develops and
patents an invention intending to commercialize it in good faith should not be classified
as a patent troll.
¶27
For many NPEs—such as universities and individual inventors—to receive
compensation for their patents, they need licensees or provable infringers that are
commercially active. Individual inventors often lack access to capital and channels of
manufacturing, marketing, and distribution. In response, these NPEs might benefit the
most by selling their patent rights to patent trolls, resulting in an immediate reward for
their inventive activities. Recent evidence suggests that some universities have begun to
52

Peter Schechter, Guest Editorial: Throwing Trolls off the Bridge, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 10, 2013),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/guest-editorial-throwing-trolls-off-the-bridge.html.
53
See Cotropia, supra note 7; Lemley, supra note 42; Risch, supra note 42.
54
See Interview by Gene Quinn with Eric Gould Bear (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2013/04/30/software-patents-drafting-for-litigation-and-a-global-economy/id=39570/ (“[T]op technology
innovators simply won’t listen to licensing overtures unless they are first sued.”).
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exercise this option,55 despite the fact that many openly consider this contrary to the
public interest.56 If the number of patent trolls were largely reduced, instead of having the
option to sell patents to parties that exploit the legal system, NPEs like universities and
individual inventors would be forced to rely upon non-exploitive alternatives that value
patents based on real-world technology.
¶28
Another problem is that some commercially active companies that invest heavily in
research and development might “find it profit-maximizing not to vertically integrate
their R&D and manufacturing processes, choosing instead to set up patent-holding
companies that focus on development, acquisition, maintenance and licensing of
intellectual property.”57 In addition, universities often assign their patents to related
entities for separate management.58 These patent-holding companies appear to be NPE
patent trolls despite their close relationship to the original inventive entity.59 Finally,
some transaction-only firms aggregate patents solely for collaborative crosslicensing/licensing-alliance purposes or for setting industry standards.60
D. Focusing on the Claimant’s Intent Rather than Status
¶29

The hallmarks of a patent troll are that it makes no products of its own, licenses
patent rights only after threatening litigation, and primarily uses threats of patent
litigation to generate revenue from licensing and settlements because potential defendants
fear costly litigation and the possibility of injunctions.61 However, which indicators, if
any, are most telling of the patent-trolling behavior that so many wish to prevent? For
instance, certain characteristics could indicate deleterious patent trolling, such as an
entity’s lack of manufacturing capability or its licensing activity prior to litigation. But as
discussed previously, this approach is both under- and over-inclusive. Thus, this Article
posits that an entity’s litigious conduct, such as whether it makes indiscriminate threats or
offers strategic settlements, provides the best guidance. In other words, the intent behind
55

See Heidi Ledford, Universities Struggle to Make Patents Pay, 501 NATURE 471, 471–2 (Sept. 2013),
available at http://www.nature.com/polopoly_fs/1.13811!/menu/main/topColumns/topLeftColumn/
pdf/501471a.pdf; see also Ashby Jones, When Lawyers Become Trolls, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970203750404577173402442681284; Ewing, supra
note 21.
56
See Memorandum from the Cal. Inst. of Tech. et al., In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in
Licensing University Technology 8 (Mar. 6, 2007), available at http://otl.stanford.edu/documents/
whitepaper-10.pdf (“[U]niversities would better serve the public interest by ensuring appropriate use of
their technology by requiring their licenses to operate under a business model that encourages
commercialization and does not rely primarily on threats of infringement litigation to generate revenue.”).
While originally drafted by eleven organizations, over ninety institutions of higher education have voiced
support for this document since 2007. See Ron Katz, Isaac Vaughn, & Mike Gilleran, Nine Points to
Consider Regarding the Payment of College Athletes, INST. OF SPORTS L. & ETHICS (2013).
57
Johnson, supra note 29, at 488.
58
See, e.g., Quick Facts, WIS. ALUMNI RESEARCH FOUND. (Oct. 1, 2011), http://www.warf.org/home/
about-us/background/quick-facts/quick-facts.cmsx.
59
Johnson, supra note 29, at 488.
60
For example, the patent aggregator RPX Corp. claims it acquires patents for defensive purposes only,
licenses every patent it owns to all of its clients, and promises never to assert any of its patents. RPX,
www.rpxcorp.com (last visited Sept. 12, 2014).
61
See Todd Klein, Comment, eBay v. MercExchange and KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.: The Supreme
Court Wages War Against Patent Trolls, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 295, 296, 300–02 (2007); M. Qaiser & P.
Mohan Chandran, Patent Terrorism: Terror of the Intangibles, IP FRONTLINE (June 27, 2006), http://
www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=11605&deptid=3; see also Ferrill, supra note 47, at 377.
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the entity’s actions should direct patent-trolling analysis, rather than its commercial
characteristics or NPE status.
¶30
An entity that lacks good-faith intent at the time of patent acquisition is more likely
to be a patent troll. Entities evince this lack of good faith if they never plan to
commercialize or otherwise practice a patent. Some NPEs might obtain a patent with the
goal of eventually commercializing the invention, whereas the true patent troll “never has
the intention of bringing the invention to market.”62 Further, patent trolls often acquire
relatively inexpensive patents from bankrupt companies or independent inventors.63 As
such, with some difference in degree, patent trolls generally inhibit or tax the
commercialization of technologies, which does not benefit the public. But it is important
to note that the grant of a patent creates only the legal right to exclude others from
practicing the patent—not the obligation to practice the patent or license patent rights to
others.64
¶31
Creating further complexities, a competitive business environment can incent
companies to switch from a business model focused on technological development to one
motivated by generating legal revenue through patent trolling. Thus, an originally
innovative and commercially active company may also manifest the problematic conduct
identified above.65 Moreover, markets now exist that allow for outside investment in
patent rights, which monetizes patents solely via patent assertion. This further promotes
patent trolling because investor returns stem either directly from a PAE’s exploitative
conduct or indirectly by the sale of patents to other PAEs intending to do the same.66
¶32
Even patent-practicing entities can exhibit behavior indicative of patent trolling
when it relates to patents “well outside the area in which they make products.”67 For
example, if a commercially active cellphone company acquires patent rights in an
unrelated industry (e.g., the medical-device industry), and then threatens active
companies in this other industry with cease-and-desist letters demanding license fees,
many would characterize this as patent trolling, despite the lack of NPE status. In fact,
cash-rich technology companies that never intend to commercialize the claimed
62

Nguyen, supra note 32, at 105; see Rep. Berman statement, supra note 18.
See Bryant, supra note 40, at 691. When bankruptcy courts approve the transfer of patent rights, the
transfer is without any encumbrances. See, e.g., In re PBBPC, Inc., 484 B.R. 860 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2013).
64
See Continental Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908) (holding that it was the
essence of the patent to exclude others without question of motive and thus establishing the principle that
patent holders have no obligation to use their patent). This principle, which is more than a century old, has
not changed. See Alexander Poltorak, Letter to the Editor, Inventors, Trolls, Patents and Improving the
System, WALL ST. J. (June 26, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732457790
4578559632006573250. In fact, there are many reasons why patent owners may not practice their patents,
including government regulations, blocking patents, and antitrust implications. See generally JANICE M.
MUELLER, INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW (2d ed. 2006); 1 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PAT. L.
FUNDAMENTALS § 1:12 (2d ed. 2014) (“A dominant patent is in some contexts referred to as a blocking
patent, because its holder can prevent others, including those who hold subservient patents, from practicing
their inventions.”).
65
See Richard S. Hill, Don’t Turn My Company into a Patent Troll!, FORBES (May 13, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2013/05/13/dont-turn-my-company-into-a-patent-troll/.
66
J. Jason Williams et al., Strategies for Combating Patent Trolls, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 372
(2010). For example, Round Rock Research is an NPE that obtained 4,200 patents with help from venturecapital fund, Gemas Capital Inc. See Jones, supra note 55.
67
Bessen, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, supra note 7, at 395; RPX CORP. REPORT, supra note 1,
at 7 (defining noncompeting entities as “operating companies asserting patents outside their areas of
products of services”); see Jones, supra note 55.
63
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technologies are often the most active patent acquirers.68 Eventually, a company may
choose to monetize a portfolio of unused patents for patent trolling or sell the patents to
others for patent trolling.69
¶33
Furthermore, a new practice called “patent privateering” has surfaced with the
potential of becoming yet another form of patent trolling.70 This practice involves
specialized patent-litigation firms, such as patent aggregators, which are assigned a patent
just for litigation and/or technology transfer purposes.71 Patent privateering can help
those who develop inventions recover remuneration from a proportion of the damages
received from infringers. In addition to outsourcing litigation, some companies create
their own patent holding companies for the sole purpose of enforcing and licensing
patents.72 Both of these approaches shield the sponsoring company from bad public
relations, antitrust lawsuits, and tortious interference with other companies.73
E. The Positive Effects of Patent Trolls and Patent Trolling
¶34

Some view patent trolling as a legitimate means of extracting value from a patent.74
The fact that a patent infringement claimant is not practicing the invention does not
disturb the basic setup of the patent system, which trades exclusive rights for a limited
time in exchange for disclosure.75 Practicing the patented technology is not required as
part of the bargain—it is only the disclosure that is required by law.76 In fact, a patent
grant from the government does not automatically confer the patentee with the legal right

68
See Joff Wild, The Entities that Own the 100 Biggest US Patent Portfolios Own Over 30% of All
Active US Patents, IAM MAGAZINE BLOG (Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/Detail.
aspx?g=840f9fef-ef84-4e4f-951d-b163251dd47d (reporting that while 140,000 entities own at least one
active U.S. patent, the top 100 entities own well over 30% of all currently active U.S. patents).
69
See Peg Brickley, Nortel Gets Court Nod for Auction of Patents, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704436004576299571398866698.
70
See Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations and Investors:
IP Privateering & Modern Letters of Marque & Reprisal, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 5 (2012); see also
Johnson, supra note 29.
71
See Klein, supra note 61, at 298–99. In 2004, Asure Software, known then as Forgent Networks, sued
forty companies worldwide for patent infringement and expects to receive more than $1 billion in licensing
fees as a result. Id.
72
Spine Solutions v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, 620 F.3d 1305, 1317–18 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(holding that the parent and sister companies of the plaintiff lacked standing for the patent infringement
claim because neither were exclusive licensees).
73
However, some proposed bills in Congress would allow fee shifting for non-prevailing parties to
reach the controlling entities of shell companies. See, e.g., H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
74
See James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of
Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 190 (2006); see also Funk, supra note 40;
Merges, supra note 22, at 1597. See generally Joel Benjamin, The Other Side of the Debate over Patent
Trolls, IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/12/10/the-other-side-of-thedebate-over-patent-trolls/id=46671/.
75
An un-commercialized patent is like a blueprint for a technology that no one can use; however,
society would rather have more blueprints for “bridges” than no bridges at all, which according to the
disclosure theory of the patent system, increases the storehouse of knowledge. But see Steven J. Moore, A
Fractured Fairy Tale: Separating Fact & Fiction on Patent Trolls, IPWATCHDOG (July 29, 2013),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/07/29/a-fractured-fairy-tale-separating-fact-fiction-on-patenttrolls/id=43697/ (positing the analogy that as mythical trolls are to travel, patent trolls are to innovation, in
that both lockup the resources found on the other side of their respective bridges).
76
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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to use or sell the patented invention. For example, the existence of a blocking patent
might prevent a patentee from ever practicing its own patent.77
The legal right to exclude others created by a patent grant is freely alienable.78
Neither the identity of the patent holder nor the means by which the patent was acquired
is generally relevant to the legality of enforcing the right—it is the conduct and intent in
bringing the litigation that matters when characterizing patent-trolling behavior. Certain
NPEs referred to as “patent monetizing entities” (PMEs) or “patent licensing entities”
(PLEs) might acquire patents as investments to generate revenue primarily from licensing
and resale, but not from litigation.79 In fact, this conduct provides incentives to invent and
promotes innovation by increasing the liquidity of patent markets.
And not all patent trolling causes deadweight economic loss.80 Some NPEs, even if
lacking good-faith intent when acquiring patents, might still provide the same benefits to
society by promoting innovation and patent liquidity. For instance, patent trolls can
obtain patents from small inventive companies and individual inventors, which helps
recoup losses for failed startups and reduces risk for inventors.81 This in turn provides
economic incentives for investing in startup technology companies because even if the
company fails, its investors own a patent portfolio that might retain some value.82 In
addition, some large companies might feel free to infringe individual inventors’ and small
businesses’ patents because the patent owner likely cannot afford the legal costs of
fighting in court. Transferring their patents to a patent troll might be an economically
sound decision that rewards them for their inventive contribution to society. Thus, even
bad-faith PAEs can provide the benefits of innovation incentives and patent liquidity to
small businesses and individual inventors.
Further, contingency-funded patent assertion might enfranchise a greater
population of patent rights for potential litigation and thus reduce costs for patentees,
especially for small-entity patent holders. That being said, the often-coercive financial
burden placed on defendants likely outweighs the equitable benefits of this legal
phenomenon.
Thus, some NPE lawsuits promote invention; increase investment in research and
development; offset financial risk for startup companies and their investors; and
compensate actual inventors who cannot enforce patents. However, from 2000–2007,
NPEs filed more than 80% of repeat patent lawsuits and owned more than 50% of the
most litigated patents, which clearly suggests an imbalance.83

77

Id.
Waterman v. Mackenzie, 137 U.S. 252, 255–56 (1891).
79
See Rembrandt Techs., LP v. Harris Corp., C.A. No. 07C-09-059-JRS, 2009 WL 402332 (Del. Super.
Ct. Feb. 12, 2009) (“Alternatively, if the patents could not be acquired, the partnership would form a joint
venture or limited partnership with the patent owner and/or financing partners, frequently resulting in the
creation of a patent licensing entity.”).
80
See Chien, supra note 3, at 479–82.
81
See McDonough, supra note 74, at 208–9.
82
See Steve Seidenberg, Troll Control, 92 A.B.A. J. 51 (2006).
83
John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, & Joshua H. Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The
Characteristics of the Most Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 24 (2009).
78
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F. Weak, Borderline, and Dubious Patent Infringement Claims are the Real Culprits
¶39

Professors Jay Kesan and David Schwartz argue that the focus should be on the
merits of the patent infringement lawsuit instead of on the characteristics or conduct of
the patent infringement claimant.84 This approach gets to the heart of the problem—a
nuisance lawsuit is by definition a complaint without a sound legal basis that is just
strong enough to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.85 One study reported that the
troll-variety of NPE rarely wins judgments against wealthy defendants.86 A different
study reported that patent trolls win on the merits less than 10% of the time, while
another found the rate to be slightly higher at 25%.87 These numbers support the common
perception that patent infringement claims brought by NPEs tend to be weak, arbitrary,
and/or legally dubious. Simply stated, weak or meritless patent infringement threats are
the gist of the patent-trolling problem because a legitimate claim would not constitute a
nuisance lawsuit. “[T]rolls . . . make money by threatening companies with expensive
lawsuits and then using that cudgel, rather than the merits of a case, to extract a financial
settlement” before the lack of merit in the case is exposed.88
¶40
In conclusion, although a patent troll is difficult to define, the assertion of credible
patent claims versus nuisance claims can be policed. Instead of identifying the patent troll
by its status to declare the entire lawsuit a nuisance,89 courts should first isolate the
nuisance patent infringement claim and then declare the patent infringement claimant’s
behavior as patent trolling. Similar to Justice Stewart’s opinion on pornography that—“I
know it when I see it”90—while one might not be able to define what constitutes a patent
troll, one can recognize certain nuisance patent infringement claims. Thus, courts should
be able to identify and handle discernible nuisance patent infringement claims regardless

84

See Cotropia, supra note 7; GAO Report, supra note 15, at 45.
Johnson, supra note 29, at 477–88.
86
Bryant, supra note 40, at 693.
87
Michael J. Mazzeo, Jonathan H. Ashtor, & Samantha Zyontz, Do NPEs Matter? Non-Practicing
Entities and Patent Litigation Outcomes, 9 J. OF COMPETITION L. & ECON. 879 (forthcoming 2014)
(reporting lower patent litigation win rates for NPEs as compared to practicing entities); Risch, supra note
42, at 481 (reporting that NPE’s lose patent infringement suits more often than practicing entities, and
further suggesting that this is caused by NPEs asserting weaker patents on average); see Allison et al.,
supra note 15; see also Abusive Patent Litigation: The Impact on American Innovation and Jobs, and
Potential Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet of the H.
Comm. of the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 10 (2013) (statement of Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President &
Gen. Counsel, Cisco Sys., Inc.) (“PAEs ultimately lose 92 percent of the time . . . versus 60 percent for
other plaintiffs.”). But see Jonathan H. Ashtor, Michael J. Mazzeo, Samantha Zyontz, Patents At Issue: The
Data Behind the Patent Troll Debate, Address at the Commercial Function of Patents in Today’s Innovation
Economy Conference (Mar. 4, 2011), available at http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/mazzeo/
htm/patents_at_issue.pdf (finding from 1995–2011 “approximately equal success rates for PAEs as for
other patent claimants”); Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing, & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects
of Patent Monetization Entities, UC HASTINGS RESEARCH PAPER No. 45 (Apr. 9, 2013) (showing that
because settlements are so common, the statistical differences in win rates between NPEs and non-NPEs
are not clear); Steven J. Moore, Probing 10 Patent Troll Myths: A Fractured Fairy Tale, IPWATCHDOG
(July 30, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/07/30/probing-10-patent-troll-myths-a-facturedfairytale-part-2/ (“[W]e saw little difference between the outcome profile of Producers and the NPEs.”).
88
Rader Op-Ed., supra note 2.
89
It is important to note that not every case brought by a patent troll lacks merit. Also, not every NPE
that asserts a patent claim is automatically patent trolling despite readily raised accusations of such by
defendants. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
90
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
85
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of the characteristics, conduct, and strategies of various patent infringement claimants,
which may evolve over time.
II. PROPOSED CHANGES TO INHIBIT PATENT TROLLING
¶41

Many have proposed solutions to combat the rise of patent trolling, which typically
focus on thwarting NPEs’ exploitation of inefficiencies in the patent litigation system.
These reforms include legislation, judicial opinions, and private-party tactics. Part II
addresses these proposals in kind.
¶42
Congress has proposed at least seven bills for this purpose over the past two years,
such as the SHIELD Act and Innovation Act discussed below.91 Given the bipartisan
nature of these bills, the intensity of lobbying by the business community, and the Obama
administration’s interest, the likelihood of legislative reform continues to increase.92
A. The Federal Response
¶43

The federal response to the rise of patent trolling has involved proposed legislation
and agency actions. The Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes
Act (SHIELD Act) would create a limited, loser-pays system that shifts litigation costs to

91

See, e.g., Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, H.R. 845, 113th
Cong. (2013) (proposing cost shifting for prevailing defendants’ legal fees and costs to infringement
claimants as a “loser-pays system,” which is similar to the default English rule, except the proposal does
not apply when the claimant is an original inventor, substantial investor, university, or technology-transfer
organization); Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013) (suggesting a variety of reforms including
fee shifting based on the outcome of the case, having the requesting party pay the cost of discovery, and
delaying discovery until after claim construction); End Anonymous Patents Act, H.R. 2024, 113th Cong.
(2013) (targeting the use of shell companies to disguise the “real party-in-interest”); Patent Litigation and
Innovation Act, H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. (2013) (proposing changes to the rules for pleadings, joinder, and
discovery in patent litigation, as well as delaying discovery until preliminary motions are resolved); Patent
Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2013) (proposing shifting the major costs of discovery to the
requesting party); Patent Quality Improvement Act, S. 866, 113th Cong. (2013) (proposing an expanded
scope for post-grant challenges to business method patents under the Covered Business Method Review
Program); Stopping Offensive Use of Patents Act, H.R. 2766, 113th Cong. (2013) (proposing a similar
expansion of post-grant challenges to business method patents under the Covered Business Method Review
Program); Patent Litigation Integrity Act, S. 1612, 113th Cong. (2013) (deterring abusive patent litigation
involving frivolous lawsuits); Patent Transparency and Improvements Act, S. 1720, 113th Cong. (2013)
(promoting transparency in patent ownership among other things); Transparency in Assertion of Patents
Act, S. 2049, 113th Cong. (2013) (attempting to reduce unfair and deceptive practices in the assertion of
patents).
92
Andrew Ramonas, Patent Troll Bills Moving up in Senate and House, CORP. COUNSEL (Nov. 19,
2013), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202628689137/Patent-Troll-Bills-Moving-Up-in-Senate-andHouse?slreturn=20140315005345; Letter from Alliance of Automobile Mfrs. et al., to Rep. John Boehner,
Speaker, H. of Reps., et al. (July 17, 2013), available at http://www.patentprogress.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/07/BigTent-Patent-Letter.pdf (“There is a growing consensus that now is the time to address
this issue.”). Other solutions should be proposed, such as clawback or bounty systems, which refund past
patent-litigation settlement payers if a patent troll loses to a subsequent defendant in litigation regarding the
same patent claims and substantially similar allegedly infringing conduct. This approach would remedy
unjust enrichment of patent trolls for all or part of settlement and/or license fees gained at the cost of
previous defendants by disgorging past, ill-gotten gains and returning them to the deserving parties. See
generally Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763
(2002); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent
Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305 (2001); Joseph S. Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation Stage
Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667 (2004).
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the non-prevailing party in patent infringement lawsuits.93 This bill aims to dissuade
PAEs from bringing meritless patent infringement lawsuits by imposing more financial
risk, and attempts to encourage accused infringers to defend the case instead of giving in
to empty threats. This loser-pays system would be limited in that inventors, original
assignees, universities, and practicing entities would not be subject to this cost shifting;
these NPEs could bring a patent infringement lawsuit without fear of paying the other
side’s costs, regardless of outcome.
¶44
Similarly, other legislation proposes that courts award reasonable fees to the
prevailing party “unless the court finds that the position and conduct of the nonprevailing
party or parties were substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award
unjust.”94 Before asserting a patent infringement claim, the claimant would have to post
bond to cover litigation costs if the PAE loses.95 Although posting a bond for litigation
costs might unfairly burden certain claimants, such as an individual inventor who wishes
to pursue a meritorious claim against a well-funded defendant, this cost shifting would
normally be justified.
¶45
This legislation alters the default American Rule, which normally requires that each
party pay its own costs. The American Rule unfortunately creates an environment where
businesses have little to gain but much to lose if they choose to fight a patent troll. A
common justification for the American Rule is that it provides everyone an opportunity to
be heard by a court without worrying about financial calamity in case of an unfortunate
or unexpected verdict.96 However, the American Rule has long been criticized because
defendants may be forced into court without much assurance that their legal expenses
will be reimbursed, even if the accusation is without merit and entirely frivolous.97 The
proposed legislation intends to remedy the downside of the American Rule in the patent
litigation context. Yet variants of the SHIELD Act have repeatedly failed to pass
Congress.
¶46
On December 5, 2013, the House of Representatives passed the Innovation Act
with a large bipartisan majority. This bill includes a modified loser-pays system that
provides for fee shifting from the prevailing party to the non-prevailing if the position
and conduct of the non-prevailing party was not reasonably justified in law and fact.98
However, unlike a closely related Senate bill requiring the asserting entity to post bond to
cover the shifted litigation costs,99 the Innovation Act does not have a bond requirement,
but holds interested parties financially responsible if the party to the litigation is unable to
pay the shifted fees.100 One of the key characteristics of the Innovation Act is that it
mandates the disclosure of the “real party-in-interest,” including assignees, licensees, and

93

It is limited in the sense that it shifts the cost only one way, from claimants to accused infringers.
S. 1612, 113th Cong. § 285 (2013).
95
Id.
96
See John F. Vargo, American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to
Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1594 (1992).
97
See id. at 1592; John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery,
47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1984).
98
H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013) (explaining that courts may find an exemptible circumstance, such as
undue hardship, for an individual inventor patent infringement claimant).
99
Patent Litigation Integrity Act, S. 1612, 113th Cong. § 285 (2013).
100
H.R. 3309.
94
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other entities.101 In addition, the Innovation Act introduces heightened pleading
requirements for patent infringement lawsuits that require the claimant to identify the
specific element of the accused instrumentality on which the patent claim reads. In other
words, the Innovation Act would render blanket demand letters lacking specific details
legally inadequate to put the receiver on notice of patent infringement, which starts the
accrual of damages.102 Importantly, the Innovation Act would limit discovery in the early
stages of patent litigation to only things related to claim construction until the Markman
hearing is completed.103 Although the Innovation Act has some components that would
help inhibit abusive behavior related to patent litigation, it is likely to wither in the Senate
like its predecessors.
¶47
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently announced tighter regulations of
patent trolls. The FTC planned to begin an investigation focused on a few selected
companies to determine if they are stockpiling patents for the sole purpose of suing others
for patent infringement.104 The investigation would include using the FTC’s subpoena
power to pierce the veil of secrecy that some patent trolls hide behind using shell
companies.105 This investigation might also consider the anticompetitive behavior of
certain patent trolls, and could suggest an antitrust investigation by the Antitrust
Division.106 However, these investigations concern criminal collusion in violation of
federal fair competition laws, and thus will unlikely have an impact on nuisance lawsuits
brought by patent trolls.
¶48
In 2013, the Obama administration went on the offensive against patent trolls,
recommending certain legislative action. President Obama announced that he would take
major steps to address the problem of patent trolls.107 In relevant parts, the announcement
recommended legislation that includes 1) requiring patentees and applicants to disclose
the “real party-in-interest,” an action aimed to publically expose the identities of patent
trolls who frivolously demand a quick and cheap licensing agreement, 2) permitting more
discretion in awarding fees to prevailing parties in patent cases, and 3) expanding the
USPTO’s transitional program designed to provide an affordable alternative to patent
litigations, among other things.108 Further, three executive actions were proposed: 1)
adopting a rule requiring patent applicants and owners to regularly update ownership
information with the USPTO in the hopes that registration records would reveal the real
party-in-interest, 2) training patent examiners to more highly scrutinize functional claims,

101

Id. The Act defines financial interest as “(i) with regard to a patent or patents, the right of a person to
receive proceeds related to the assertion of the patent or patents, including a fixed or variable portion of
such proceeds; and (ii) with regard to the plaintiff, direct or indirect ownership or control by a person of
more than 5 percent of such plaintiff.” Id. § 4.
102
See 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2003).
103
H.R. 3309, § 299A.
104
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Seeks to Examine Patent Assertion Entities and Their
Impact on Innovation, Competition (Sept. 27, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2013/09/ftc-seeks-examine-patent-assertion-entities-their-impact.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Press Release, Exec. Office of the President, Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on High-Tech
Patent Issues (June 4, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/factsheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-issues.
108
Id.
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which have been heavily exploited by patent trolls, and 3) expanding dedicated outreach
studies with regard to patent policies and laws.109
B. Deficiencies in the Various Federal Proposals
¶49

While many of the proposed laws could have a major impact on patent litigation,
none would sufficiently deter the majority of patent trolling. First, executive action would
unlikely have significant impact, even if Congress implements all the recommendations
as planned. The recommendation for cost-shifting legislation only adds support for the
passage of the SHIELD Act, and the recommendation to expand the study of patent
policies ensures only more questions, not solutions. Second, the implementation of the
SHIELD Act might discourage a patent-rights holder with limited financial resources
from bringing a meritorious patent action against zealous or previously successful
defendant infringers. As a result, this legislative approach might have the unintended
consequence of creating something similar to the core problem stemming from the
English Rule (non-prevailing parties always pay opposing parties’ legal fees), which
denies an opportunity for some legitimate patent infringement claimants from ever
having their day in court.110
¶50
Less significant proposals include expanding the covered-business-method review
program, providing better training for patent examiners, imposing heightened pleading
standards for claims of patent infringement, and revealing the “real party-in-interest.”
First, training patent examiners to issue less vague and abstract patent claims and making
patent review under the USPTO’s transitional program available to more patents would
reduce the arsenal of patent claims available for patent trolling prospectively. It would
not, however, directly and immediately thwart patent trolling. Second, revealing the “real
party-in-interest” is unlikely to significantly deter patent trolling, but would assist the
receivers of cease-and-desist letters in gathering information about a common accuser,
which thus helps private parties better prepare for and defend against frivolous patent
infringement allegations.111 Lastly, the stricter pleading standards proposed by the Patent
Litigation and Innovation Act would merely nationalize the local patent rules of several
districts.112

109

Id.
See Letter from Louis J. Foreman, CEO, Enventys & Edison Nation, et al., to Sen. Patrick J. Leahy,
Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, et al. 6 (Nov. 19, 2013), available at http://democrats.judiciary.house.
gov/sites/democrats.judiciary.house.gov/files/documents/InventGrp131119.pdf (“[The U.S.] rejected the
British system in large part to allow all citizens access to courts, in which disputes would be resolved on
the merits. Over the years, when Congress has granted exceptions to the American Rule, it has generally
been for the purpose of encouraging litigation by creating ‘private attorneys general’ to conduct litigation to
enforce public policies that might otherwise be too risky to pursue.”). Congress granted exceptions to the
American Rule when passing the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts of the mid-1960s, the Equal Access
to Justice Act, the Truth in Lending Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the Freedom of Information
Act. Id.
111
See infra Part II.D.
112
See, e.g., Connectel, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 2d 526, 528 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (applying
Local Patent Rules for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas); D.C.COLO.LPtR 1–17
(outlining proposed local patent rules for the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado); see also
Megan M. La Belle, The Local Rules of Patent Procedure, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2015). However,
the Eastern District of Texas has not experienced a decrease in patent troll litigation. RPX CORP. REPORT,
supra note 1, at 4; 2012 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY, supra note 1.
110
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In summary, encouraging businesses to stand up to patent trolls reduces the amount
of frivolous claims that result in settlement and license fees. This makes patent trolling
less profitable and reduces the patent arsenal available for patent trolls to exploit the
patent system. Ultimately, this has the collective effect of reducing patent trolling by an
amount equated to the increased risk of pursuing a claim resulting in financial loss, which
leaves the patent-trolling problem for the market to decide after only a slight modification
to the cost/risk asymmetries discussed supra Part I.B. However, small businesses cannot
afford costly litigation, and even well-funded businesses are unlikely to willingly engage
in litigation unless the licensing deal offered by patent trolls costs more than litigation.
And as discussed previously, patent trolls will make every calculation before offering a
deal in order to avoid asking for too much. Thus, market participants will likely continue
to pay off patent trolls to make these nuisance lawsuits go away, albeit at a lower price
than at present. By marginally readjusting the economic asymmetries against the patent
troll, these proposals serve, at best, as only a partial fix for the fundamental problem of
patent-trolling exploitation of litigation inefficiencies. Notably, the preceding fee-shifting
proposals penalize not only the patent trolls, but also other non-prevailing NPEs.
C. One State at the Vanguard in Fighting Patent Trolling

¶52

The states, as well as the courts, have acknowledged the patent trolls’ exploitation
of the patent system. Lawmakers backed by entrepreneurial funding have tried to address
the patent-trolling problem at the state level.113 Their efforts focus on creating a hostile
environment for those acting in bad faith and exploiting the system. States have taken
steps to hinder patent-trolling entities by making it more likely that claimants, when
shown to be acting in bad faith, reimburse unfairly accused infringers for litigation costs.
¶53
The first state action occurred in 2013 when the State of Vermont filed a lawsuit
against MPHJ Technology Investment, LLC, an entity alleged to have a track record of
harassing Vermont businesses.114 Meanwhile, taking effect on July 1, 2013, a law titled
“Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringement,” was enacted.115
¶54
The Vermont law allows targets of patent trolling to bring retaliatory actions (in
state and federal district courts) to obtain compensatory and exemplary damages, plus
costs and fees.116 The Vermont law created a factor-based test to determine when acts
constitute bad-faith patent assertions.117 The test identifies non-exhaustive factors that
might indicate bad faith by the PAE, such as sending demand-letters that lack basic
information about the infringement claim or that seek payment of unreasonable royalty
fees.118 In contrast, factors that suggest good-faith patent assertion by an NPE include
whether the PAE is the original inventor or an educational institution.119
¶55
Over a dozen states have followed Vermont’s lead and enacted similar laws, and
about a dozen more states are considering doing the same.120 However, state actions face
113

See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195–99 (2013).
See Complaint, Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Inv., LLC, No. 282-5-13Wncv (Vt. Sup. Ct. 2012).
115
§§ 4195–99.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Anti-patent-troll laws exist in these states: Alabama (S.B. 121, Reg. Sess. (2014)), Georgia (Act 513,
114
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multiple limitations in restricting the activities of patent trolls. The long-term effects of
these state actions are hard to predict, especially because this approach is subject to
judicial review. Ultimately, a federal court will have to decide whether a state law
restricting patent rights is, or is not, preempted by federal law.121
¶56
Many criticize individual state laws for being non-uniform and suppressing the
rights of patent holders. First, differing state laws might force multistate companies to
employ state-specific defensive strategies against patent trolls, which is both inefficient
and potentially costly. Further, patent trolls are better equipped to formulate new
manipulative strategies to overcome state action. Thus, this lack of uniformity might in
fact exacerbate current legal asymmetries in the patent litigation system. Second, as
mentioned above, state legislation might impermissibly restrict the federal rights of
patent-rights holders, thereby rendering the laws preempted. In the end, the best solution
requires a uniform approach in order to both level the legal playing field and not
discourage legitimate patent infringement lawsuits brought in good faith.
D. Private-Party Tactics
¶57

One counter to the patent-trolling problem is the creation of a public registry of
demand letters.122 This enables small players to better understand why they might have
been targeted by a cease-and-desist letter or license offer. Further, it allows future targets
of patent trolling to take preventative measures by exposing certain entities using shotgun
tactics and their corresponding, previously asserted patents. An example is the Electronic
Frontier Foundation’s Trolling Effects, which allows users to share and get information
on demand letters.123
¶58
Another solution is one where potential defendants can cooperatively form
litigation cost-sharing arrangements to lower legal expenses, such as through jointdefense and representation groups. These arrangements enable the sharing of work
product and privileged information without having to waive attorney–client privilege and
work–product immunity. However, these contractual agreements often obligate members
to litigate to the judgment stage, which is often prohibitively expensive, even when
parties share the financial burden.124
¶59
In conclusion, although these state and federal actions have merit, none focuses on
the inherent wrongfulness of the patent troll’s exploitative conduct. Rather, state and
Reg. Sess. (2014)), Idaho (S.B. 1354, 62d Leg. (2014)), Illinois (S.B. 3405, 98th Gen. Assemb. (2014)),
Louisiana (S.B. 255, Reg. Sess. (2014)), Maine (S.P. 654, 126th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2014)), Maryland (S.B.
585, Reg. Sess. (2014)), Missouri (H.B. 1374, Reg. Sess. (2014)), New Hampshire (S.B. 303, Reg. Sess.
(2014)), Oklahoma (H.B. 2837, 54th Leg., 2d Sess. (2014)), Oregon (S.B. 1540, Reg. Sess. (2014)), South
Dakota (S.B. 143, Reg. Sess. (2014)), Tennessee (H.B. 2117, 108th Reg. Sess. (2014)), Utah (H.B. 117,
Gen. Sess. (2014)), Virginia (H.B. 375, Reg. Sess. (2014)), and Wisconsin (Act 339, Reg. Sess. (2013)).
Other states are currently considering similar legislation—Connecticut, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan,
Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Carolina. See Tony
Dutra, Nine States Now Have Enacted Legislation Targeting Patent Troll Demand Letter Abuse,
BLOOMBERG BNA (May 7, 2014), http://www.bna.com/nine-states-enacted-n17179890261/. The Virginia
law (H.B. 375) is unique in that it lays out indicia of bad faith or lack thereof for letters containing
accusations of patent infringement, such as cease-and-desist letters and demands for licenses.
121
See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000).
122
See, e.g., TROLLING EFFECTS, https://trollingeffects.org/letters (last visited Dec. 31, 2013).
123
See id.
124
See Dura Global Techs., Inc. v. Magna Donnelly Corp., 662 F. Supp. 2d 855 (E.D. Mich. 2009).
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federal legislators and administrative branches seem to be simply reacting to the outcry of
businesses that the patent system is flawed and hurting the economy by using quick-fix
patent law reforms. These government actions might make patent litigation a slightly less
nurturing environment for patent trolls, especially by increasing the risk of losing a
lawsuit. However, the most progressive proposals would also weaken the patent system
as a whole by inhibiting the ability of some legitimate patent holders to litigate good
faith, non-frivolous patent claims.125 For instance, as discussed supra Part II.B., the
SHIELD Act and the Innovation Act are over-inclusive because they punish nonpredatory PAEs with meritorious complaints. These unintended consequences and
constraints on patent enforcement could inhibit legitimate claims, devalue patents, and
endanger future innovation.126 In addition, these proposals might impede the free transfer
of patents, which helps entities—often individual inventors—move assets in return for
capital, and allows the recirculation of capital to investors from failed companies.
III. RULE 11 ANALYSES FOR CLAIMS OF PATENT INFRINGEMENT
¶60

Irrespective of one’s view on the positives or negatives of patent trolling, the
economics of patent trolling indisputably rely on high patent litigation costs and
inefficiencies in the patent litigation system, both of which help NPEs monetize patents
by threatening to bring dubious claims and forcing businesses to pay unwarranted license
fees. Some of these inefficiencies stem from the sheer complexity and cost of patent
litigation in general. However, other inefficiencies are caused simply by the structure and
design of civil procedural rules. To combat the latter, this Article proposes that district
courts use a specialized Rule 11-based approach that imposes sanctions against parties
who objectively appear to be patent trolling.
A. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 11 Background

¶61

Attempts to manipulate and take advantage of inefficiencies in the legal system are
not new. In 1937, when the Supreme Court proposed the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (FRCP), the Court was concerned about frivolous lawsuits.127 Rule 11 of the
FRCP clearly renounces any conduct before the court that serves “an improper purpose
such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of
litigation.”128

125

See Hon. Paul Michel, C.J., Fed. Cir., Address at the 15th Annual Niro Distinguished Intellectual
Property Lecture: How to Retain Patent Enforcement While Reforming It—Judges and Counsel Should
Manage Infringement Suits, Not Congress (Oct. 15, 2013) (“If passed, the bills separately and together
would weaken the patent system; not strengthen it. None of these current bills would address the problems
with the current patent system: litigation is slow, complicated and unpredictable. The bills, however, would
make litigation slower, more complicated and less predictable.”); David J. Kappos, Op-Ed., Let’s Not Miss
this Opportunity for Consensus-Based Patent Reform, THE HILL (Dec. 5, 2013), http://thehill.com/opinion/
op-ed/192063-lets-not-miss-this-opportunity-for-consensus-based-patent-reform (“[S]ome are using the
need to address the patent troll issue as cover to unnecessarily weaken our nation’s patent laws.”).
126
See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 49 (2013) (testimony of C. Graham Gerst, Global IP Law Grp., LLC) (urging
Congress not to pass the SHIELD Act or other patent reforms involving cost shifting).
127
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1937).
128
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1).

315

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

[2014

¶62

The main purpose of Rule 11 is to deter improper litigious conduct and reduce the
growing cost and burdensomeness of civil litigation.129 Rule 11 arises from the
judiciary’s inherent equity powers, one of which is the ability to sanction both parties and
attorneys for certain actions. This punishable conduct includes engaging in frivolous or
vexatious litigation.130
¶63
In U.S. courts, an attorney of record must sign every pleading, written motion, and
other paper, unless the party is unrepresented.131 By signing, the attorney certifies to the
court that the paper is not frivolous in its content and purpose to the best of the attorney’s
knowledge, information, and belief.132 Similarly, an unrepresented party must certify
every paper submitted to the court.133 Therefore, in theory, neither side should
intentionally harass, unnecessarily delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation,
except under the threat of sanctions.
¶64
Rule 11 imposes requirements for both asserted facts and legal arguments. It
mandates that factual contentions before a court “have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery.”134 And it requires that “the claims,
defenses, or other legal contentions” before a court be “warranted by existing law or by a
non-frivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law.”135
¶65
If Rule 11 sanctions are proper, the court has discretion to impose punishment on
the attorney and/or the party.136 The power of the court to sanction attorneys for frivolous
complaint filing was a continuation of former Federal Equity Rule 24, which punished
perceived litigation abuses by weeding out frivolous, unnecessary, or unfounded
pleadings.137 According to the 1983 amendment, Rule 11 sanctions were mandatory if the
elements were met; however, such a strict approach turned out to be unsuccessful in
practice, and Rule 11 was eventually modified such that sanctions are now available on a

129

FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (amended 1993); see Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681,
709 n.42 (1997) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2)) (“[Rule 11 sanctions] may be set at a level ‘sufficient to
deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.’”); Donaldson v. Clark,
819 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
130
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (amended 1993) (“Since its original promulgation, Rule
11 has provided for the striking of pleadings and the imposition of disciplinary sanctions to check abuses in
the signing of pleadings. Its provisions have always applied to motions and other papers by virtue of
incorporation by reference in Rule 7(b)(2). The amendment and the addition of Rule 7(b)(3) expressly
confirms this applicability.”); see, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 40–41 (1991).
131
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a).
132
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) (“[T]he court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law
firm, or party.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (“Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any
court . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by
the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because
of such conduct.”). Although Rule 11 has been silent on the point, courts have claimed the power to impose
sanctions on an attorney personally, either by imposing costs or holding them in contempt of court. See 5
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1334
(1969); 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 11.02 (2d ed. 1988).
137
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (amended 1937).
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discretionary basis after a party to the litigation files a motion.138 In addition, the FRCP
expressly give the district courts discretion to file sua sponte motions for Rule 11
sanctions because courts appeared reluctant to intervene without a request from one of
the parties to the litigation.139 Today, federal courts have tremendous discretion to
proactively detect and punish Rule 11 violations to deter inappropriate conduct and
ensure the proper operation of the legal system.
B. Rule 11 and Asserting Patent Infringement Claims:
Reasonable Pre-Filing Investigation
¶66

The following sections explain the current application of Rule 11 sanctions in the
context of assertions of patent infringement. In a patent case invoking Rule 11 sanctions,
“courts are often asked to weigh whether the substantive allegations are so weak that they
are not grounded in fact and legally tenable.”140 A party claiming patent infringement
must perform a good faith, two-step analysis before filing the lawsuit or counterclaim.
That said, Rule 11 awards against signing attorneys appear to occur less frequently in
patent infringement cases than those resulting from the Patent Statute’s cost-shifting
provisions for “exceptional” cases.141
1. Standards for Enforcing Rule 11 Sanctions for Bad-Faith Patent
Infringement Assertions

¶67

Through appellate opinions, the Federal Circuit has shaped Rule 11 jurisprudence
in the context of patent infringement.142 Generally, Rule 11 requires all factual
contentions to have sufficient evidentiary support or at least a likelihood thereof
following discovery. It further requires that all claims be either warranted by existing
law, or in the alternative, based on a non-frivolous argument to change the law.143
¶68
For patent infringement claims, Rule 11 sanctions may be imposed if the claimant’s
attorney fails to perform a reasonable inquiry, often evinced by improper due diligence.
Stated broadly, attorneys must adequately investigate the facts prior to filing the claim of
infringement.144 Currently, the Federal Circuit has two reasonable inquiry requirements,
the failure to meet either of which can justify enforcing Rule 11 sanctions.145 A
reasonable inquiry requires a good-faith effort to 1) construe the patent claims to the
extent necessary to support the claim and 2) compare the patent claim to the accused
138

Id.
Id. (“[T]he power of the court to act on its own initiative is retained.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory
committee’s note (amended 1983) (“Courts currently appear to believe they may impose sanctions on their
own motion. See N. Am. Trading Corp. v. Zale Corp., 83 F.R.D. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Authority to do so
has been made explicit in order to overcome the traditional reluctance of courts to intervene unless
requested to do so by one of the parties.”).
140
Raylon, LLC v. Complus Data Innovations, Inc., 700 F.3d 1361, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
141
See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
142
See Judin v. United States, 110 F.3d 780, 784 (Fed. Cir. 1997); S. Bravo Sys., Inc. v. Containment
Techs. Corp., 96 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
143
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
144
See Phonometrics, Inc. v. Econ. Inns of Am., 349 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
145
See, e.g., S. Bravo Sys., Inc., 96 F.3d at 1373 (vacating district court order denying Rule 11 sanctions
and remanding for further consideration where attorney had apparently failed to conduct an adequate
inquiry).
139
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infringer’s product, apparatus, or method.146 Under the former, the claimant’s attorney
has a pre-filing duty to independently and reasonably construe the patent claim(s). Under
the latter, the claimant’s attorney has a pre-filing duty to investigate the infringement
accusation(s) by exhausting all publicly available material and information, such as by
obtaining or inspecting the accused infringer’s product or process.147
¶69
Each regional circuit can have its own circuit-specific Rule 11 standards because,
when reviewing patent cases, the Federal Circuit defers to each regional circuit law as
long as a certain issue is not exclusive to patent law.148 However, regional circuit
standards are generally uniform, as all have adopted an objective standard with only
slight variations in specific language.149 The consensus is that at the time of filing a
complaint for patent infringement: 1) the claimant must independently construe the patent
claim, 2) the claim construction must be objectively sound, and 3) the claimant must
make the infringement judgment after exhausting all available methods publicly
known.150
2. Attorney’s Independent and Objectively Reasonable Construction of the Patent Claim
¶70

For the first reasonable inquiry requirement, the claimant must be able to provide
adequate support for a claim construction that renders the alleged infringer’s conduct
within the scope of the claim(s).151 Because this judgment depends on a question of law
as to claim construction, it is subject to the Rule 11(b)(2) requirement that all legal
arguments be non-frivolous.152 Therefore, an attorney seeking to file a patent
infringement claim should not rely solely on her client’s claim interpretation. Instead, the
attorney has an affirmative duty to perform an independent claim analysis.153
¶71
In South Bravo Systems v. Containment Technologies, the plaintiff’s lawyers failed
to independently construe the patent claims at issue and compare their claim construction
with the accused devices or products.154 Although the patentee conferred with the lawyer
regarding his observation of the accused device, such blind reliance on a lay opinion was
sanctionable.155

146

Id. at 1375.
See Judin, 110 F.3d at 784–85.
148
See Kathleen M. Dorr, Annotation, Comment Note—General Principles Regarding Imposition of
Sanctions Under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 A.L.R. FED. 107, § 6(a) (1989); see, e.g.,
Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 857–58 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[O]ur practice has
been to defer to regional circuit law when the precise issue involves an interpretation of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure or the local rules of the district court.”).
149
See Dorr, supra note 148.
150
S. Bravo, 96 F.3d at 1375.
151
Judin, 110 F.3d at 784.
152
Id. Sua sponte motions put the burden on the party to be sanctioned to show the justification for his
or her actions under Rule 11. Id.; see, e.g., Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1560 (11th Cir. 1987) (en
banc) (“The accused must be given an opportunity to respond, orally or in writing as may be appropriate, to
the invocation of Rule 11 and to justify his or her actions.”).
153
See Judin, 110 F.3d at 784.
154
S. Bravo, 96 F.3d at 1374.
155
Id. at 1375 (finding district court abused its discretion because “there [was] no evidence that either of
[patentee’s] attorneys ever compared the accused devices with the patent claims”). The Federal Circuit
opined that blind reliance on a lay client for the factual and legal questions of infringement would rarely
constitute a reasonable inquiry under Rule 11. See id.
147
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¶72

In addition, the claim construction must read on the apparatus or process/method,
and under Rule 11(b)(3) there must be evidentiary support for all factual allegations as to
the infringement.156 Because all questions of fact will be determined later in litigation,
this requirement of evidentiary support is germane to not overstretching Rule 11
sanctions. In fact, the sufficiency of evidentiary support should be determined based not
on the court’s (therefore the correct) claim construction, but on any independent, goodfaith construction relied on in the complaint.157
¶73
For example, in Antonious v. Spaulding & Evenflo Companies, Rule 11 sanctions
were not proper even though the plaintiff attorneys’ patent claim construction was
inconsistent with the court’s claim construction because the claimant’s argued-for claim
construction was not frivolous.158 Although the court’s claim construction did not read on
the accused-infringer’s products—and thus no patent infringement could be found—this
was immaterial. Because the evidence supported the claimant’s construction and read on
the accused-infringer’s products, the argument was not frivolous.159
¶74
Additionally, preclusive effects from concurrent proceedings can affect inquiries
for Rule 11 sanctions. In Phonometrics, Inc. v. Economy Inns of America, the claimant
owned a patent claiming a device that computed, recorded, and showed the cost of longdistance phone calls via a digital display, which he accused the hotel chain of
infringing.160 The patent owner had previously sued various manufacturers and sellers of
telephone equipment on similar grounds in cases still pending at the time of filing.161 He
was meanwhile also engaged in various lawsuits against other hotel chains.162 The
specific complaint in Phonometrics was based on a claim construction where a digital
display showed the cost of a long-distance phone call to anyone, including hotel
employees.163
¶75
In one of the manufacturing lawsuits, the Federal Circuit ruled on its claim
construction and disagreed with the patent owner’s construction, holding that the claim
limitation “digital display” did not include a machine-readable device.164 Subsequently,
the Federal Circuit concluded that the language “substantially instantaneous” limited the

156

Antonious v. Spaulding & Evenflo Cos., 275 F.3d 1066, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[A]n attorney
violates Rule 11(b)(3) when an objectively reasonable attorney would not believe, based on some actual
evidence uncovered during prefiling investigation, that each claim limitation reads on the accused device
literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.”).
157
Id.
158
Id. at 1068–71.
159
When reviewing a determination of the first reasonable inquiry requirement, the Federal Circuit must
apply the standard of the regional circuit that the case was appealed from because it is a question of law.
Antonious, 275 F.3d at 1072. “[T]o satisfy that requirement, there must be ‘some basis in law’ to support
each legal argument in the complaint.” Id. For instance, under the Fourth Circuit’s standard, a claim
construction would be unjustified if a reasonable lawyer would recognize it as frivolous. See Cox v.
Saunders, 136 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 1998).
160
Phonometrics, Inc. v. Econ. Inns of Am., 349 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
161
See, e.g., Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
162
Phonometrics, 349 F.3d at 1358–59.
163
The previous court held the patent claim language “digital display” did not include machine-readable
devices, but it did not require that the display be shown directly to the persons placing the calls.
Phonometrics, 349 F.3d at 1367. Therefore, the plaintiff may have properly argued that one employed by
the hotel must have access to some display, thus infringing the patent. See id. at 1359. But see
Phonometrics, Inc. v. N. Telecom Inc., 133 F.3d 1459, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
164
Phonometrics, 349 F.3d at 1358–59.
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claim scope for the “digital display.” As a result, the Phonometrics court held that only a
hotel-guest caller, and not any hotel employees, must be able to perceive the cost of a
long-distance call through a digital display during and after the call to warrant
infringement.165
¶76
The defendants in Phonometrics moved for Rule 11 sanctions against the attorney
that filed the patent infringement complaint.166 The district court granted Rule 11
sanctions, which the Federal Circuit upheld based on two premises: 1) the patent
infringement claimant must voluntary dismiss any claims incongruent with a precedential
claim construction, even if the precedent came down after the filing of the claim,167 and
2) although it is possible to abolish a precedential claim construction from a previous
case during litigation, the precedential claim construction is binding against subsequent
litigants within the same context.168
3. Infringement Judgment Only After Exhausting All Publicly Available
Materials and Information
¶77

For the second reasonable inquiry requirement, the claimant’s attorney must
attempt to obtain or inspect an allegedly infringing product, apparatus, or process before
making an infringement judgment. Attempts to obtain or inspect must exhaust all
publicly available methods possible without judicial recourse.
¶78
In Judin v. United States, the Federal Circuit reversed a denial of Rule 11 sanctions,
ruling that a lack of due diligence in trying to obtain or inspect a non-consumer
product—a barcode scanner used by the U.S. Post Office—was sanctionable.169 This
holding is particularly striking because the Federal Circuit showed very little leniency to
the reality that the claimant’s claim construction obviated the necessity of a close
inspection of the accused device.170 Thus, the second step could be that the claimant must
at least attempt to obtain or inspect the accused infringer’s product or process, even if it is
impossible to do so, regardless of the necessity to examine the product before concluding
that the patent claim reads on it.171
¶79
Conversely, in Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Company, the Federal Circuit
affirmed a denial of Rule 11 sanctions even though the claimant performed only cursory
analysis of the defendant’s product.172 Q-Pharma sued a lotion manufacturer for
165

Id. at 1359.
Id. at 1360.
167
Id. at 1361 (discussing how Rule 11 applies to later advocating “untenable contentions made in
previously-filed papers”).
168
Phonometrics, 349 F.3d at 1362–63. On the other hand, Judge Newman would have vacated the
sanctions because the claim construction in Northern Telecom was only non-precedential dicta outside the
context of an equipment-manufacturer defendant, and similarly, the Choice Hotels opinion was nonprecedential. Phonometrics, 349 F.3d at 1367–68 (Newman, C.J., dissenting) (citing Phonometrics, Inc. v.
N. Telecom, Inc., 133 F.3d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1998), and Phonometrics, Inc. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 21 F.
App’x 910, 2001 WL 1217219 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
169
Judin v. United States, 110 F.3d 780, 784 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
170
Id. at 783 (“[A] more thoughtful pre-filing examination would not likely have deterred Judin’s
interest in the suit.”).
171
See id. at 782; see, e.g., View Eng’g Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 208 F.3d 981 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Invamed Inc., 213 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Cambridge Prods. Ltd. v. Penn
Nutrients Inc., 962 F.2d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
172
Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
166
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infringing its patent related to lotions containing Coenzyme Q10 (CoQ10).173 Rule 11
sanctions were not imposed against Q-Pharma’s attorneys for failure to perform a
chemical analysis before filing the patent infringement claim to confirm the composition
of the allegedly infringing lotion.174 The court held that Q-Pharma’s attorneys met the
Rule 11 requirements by 1) interpreting the patent and concluding the limitation,
“therapeutically effective amount,” meant any amount with no specified threshold, and 2)
acquiring a sample of the CoQ10 lotion to review its label and other advertising materials
in order to conclude that the lotion contained at least some CoQ10.175
¶80
Further, parties asserting counterclaims are similarly required to fulfill the
reasonable inquiry requirements. In View Engineering Inc. v. Robotic Vision Systems,
Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed an imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against a defendant
who failed to exhaust the judicial process in its pre-claim investigation.176 View
Engineering initially sued Robotic Vision Systems (Robotic) for patent infringement of
View Engineering’s patent.177 In response, Robotic’s attorney brought counterclaims for
patent infringement of several of Robotic’s patents.178 The pre-filing investigation by
Robotic’s attorney merely consisted of obtaining advertising materials because “View
[Engineering] refused to permit examination of its machine or drawings.”179 The Federal
Circuit affirmed the sanctions against Robotic’s attorney by reasoning that the attorney
“had the opportunity to file immediately for the protective order that eventually resulted
in discovery.”180 Following this logic, the pre-complaint-filing inquiry should not end
until all publicly available options are exhausted, including judicial recourse in case of
counterclaims.
¶81
While the Q-Pharma opinion is on the lenient side and the View Engineering
opinion is on the strict side, the Federal Circuit distinguished Q-Pharma from View
Engineering in that “an infringement analysis can simply consist of a good faith,
informed comparison of the claims of a patent against the accused subject matter.”181 The
Federal Circuit held that Q-Pharma’s claim interpretation was independent and made in
good faith, and that it had obtained and analyzed the accused product to the point where
the analysis led to a plausible infringement claim,182 whereas in View Engineering,
Robotic’s attorney seemed to have quickly filed a counterclaim of patent infringement
without adequate due diligence.
4. Putting the Two Steps of the Reasonable Inquiry Together
¶82

The PAE must attempt to obtain or inspect infringing products or processes
regardless of its necessity determined upon completion of the first reasonable inquiry
step. However, the PAE may stop performing due diligence at the point when observation
173

Id. at 1297–98.
Id. at 1297, 1300.
175
Id. at 1301.
176
View Eng’g, 208 F.3d at 981.
177
Id. at 982.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 985.
180
Id. at 986.
181
Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
182
Id.
174
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or analysis of the accused apparatus or method leads to a plausible claim of infringement
upon the independent and good-faith claim construction from the first step.
A plausible excuse for stopping the second reasonable inquiry step, which might
fulfill the Rule 11 duty, must be distinguished from a plausible claim of infringement. In
View Engineering, Rule 11 sanctions were warranted when a party only asked the other
party to cooperate, which turned out to be futile, and did not follow through by
petitioning for judicial recourse to compel cooperation.183 Although the original
defendant raised the excuse of the plaintiff’s lack of cooperation with regard to the
production of certain information, without attempting to exhaust any available judicial
recourse, the second step was inadequate under Rule 11.184
Nonetheless, there is an impracticability excuse for ending the second step inquiry
without obtaining adequate evidentiary support for infringement claims. Such an
excusable circumstance was found in Hoffman La Roche, Inc. v. Invamed, Inc., where a
product made by a patented process was reverse engineered by a competitor. However,
the details of the competitor’s manufacturing process were concealed from the public,
which further contributed to the patent owner’s suspicions.185 The patent owner sued for
patent infringement of its manufacturing process, and stated, “plaintiffs are presently not
aware of any analytical technique which can be used to definitively establish that the
[generic form of defendant’s proprietary drug] was made by use of the invention of one
or more claims of the [plaintiff’s patents].”186 Over the course of litigation, the defendant
disclosed the process at issue, and the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit after
concluding non-infringement.187
Subsequently, the defendant moved for Rule 11 sanctions.188 The Federal Circuit
agreed with the district court’s denial of Rule 11 sanctions where, although the plaintiffs
could have assumed a lack of factual support for non-infringement when the pre-filing
investigation met a dead-end, they chose to file suit to engage in discovery. 189 Therefore,
the patent holder could seek judicial recourse to investigate the infringement where there
was no practical alternative to discovery.190
Parties can detail the reasonable inquiry requirements under Rule 11 before filing a
complaint. The claimant’s attorney must: 1) independently construe the patent claims in
good faith, which may differ from the court’s construction; 2) initiate a factual
investigation even though their independent claim construction obviated this necessity in
the abstract; and 3) continue the factual investigation until the facts lead to a plausible
claim of infringement or the investigation becomes impracticable by all publicly
available means other than filing the complaint. In addition, it should be noted that courts
183

View Eng’g, 208 F.3d at 986.
Id.
185
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Invamed Inc., 213 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
186
Id.
187
Id. at 1364.
188
Id. at 1362.
189
Id. at 1363 (“[Defendant] refused to disclose the manufacturing processes because of a
confidentiality agreement it had with the manufacturer.”).
190
Id. at 1364–65 (“[The plaintiff in Cambridge] had tested a sample of the allegedly infringing product
and had commissioned further chemical analyses and acquired documentary evidence that appeared to
confirm that the product alleged to infringe fell within the chemical specifications of the patented method.
Without the aid of discovery, any further information was not practicably obtainable.”) (quoting Cambridge
Prods. Ltd. v. Penn Nutrients Inc., 962 F.2d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
184
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cannot base a Rule 11 sanction exclusively on incongruence between its claim
construction and the claimant’s claim construction.191
5. New Legal Theories and Arguing for a Change of Law
¶87

Despite preclusive effects and Rule 11 sanctions, parties may argue for a change in
the law if the argument is non-frivolous.192 However, the time and place of the argument
for a change of law matters. In Phonometrics, the litigant’s insistence on the same claim
construction despite previous contradicting final judgments resulted in a proper finding of
Rule 11 sanctions.193 The Federal Circuit implied that if the attorney wanted to make an
argument for a change of law, the attorney should have appealed the previous rulings,
rather than sue different defendants and then argue for a change in claim construction.194
¶88
It makes sense that a claimant may not argue for a change of the claim construction
simply because he sues different defendants. While the claimant should not be
discouraged from bringing lawsuits against other defendants after a single lawsuit fails,
courts should not waste time and resources reading and interpreting the same patent, and
should only rely on the factual differences when an opposite result is clearly warranted.
6. Recent Developments in Rule 11 Jurisprudence: Acknowledging Patent Trolling
¶89

In Eon-Net v. Flagstar Bancorp, the district court held that Eon-Net brought a
baseless claim in bad faith because its patent claim construction was unwarranted by the
written description and the lawsuit exhibited “indicia of extortion.”195 Eon-Net had filed
nearly identical patent infringement complaints against almost one hundred different
defendants and offered quick settlements at prices far below the cost of litigation.196 On
appeal, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s imposition of Rule 11 sanctions
against Eon-Net.197
¶90
Eon-Net was a holding company for a patent portfolio of document-processing
systems. The district court found that Eon-Net did not perform an objective evaluation of
the claim and thus failed to satisfy the Rule 11 requirements.198 The court ordered EonNet to pay over $600,000 in Rule 11 sanctions plus all legal costs. This order followed
the court’s declaration that this was an exceptional case pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285.199
These financial sanctions roughly equated with the cost of litigation if the parties had
reached the summary judgment stage in the district court.
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See Antonious v. Spaulding & Evenflo Cos., 275 F.3d 1066, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).
193
Phonometrics, Inc. v. Econ. Inns of Am., 349 F.3d 1356, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
194
See id. at 1363 (“However sincere Phonometrics and Mr. Sutton may be in their belief that the
construction of the limitation at issue stated in Northern Telecom, and reiterated and followed ‘[u]nder
principles of stare decisis’ in Choice Hotels and by the district court in case after case brought by
Phonometrics, is incorrect, their position is simply without legal merit.”).
195
Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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Id. Eon-Net’s previous settlement offers were based on sales by the defendant. For example,
“$25,000 for sales less than $3,000,000; $50,000 for sales between $3,000,000 and $20,000,000; and
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The plaintiff in Eon-Net tried to examine the defendant’s website, which allegedly
infringed Eon-Net’s patent on a document-processing system. The court noted that a
proper pre-filing investigation “requires counsel to perform an objective evaluation of the
claim terms when reading those terms on the accused device.”200 The district court found
that Eon-Net brought a baseless claim in bad faith because its claim construction was
unwarranted by the written description. Furthermore, the court noted that Eon-Net
showed “indicia of extortion” by bringing multiple claims demanding quick settlements
at prices below the cost of defending the litigations.201 Regardless of how well the claim
construction read on the accused website, because Eon-Net did not perform an objective
evaluation of the claim, it failed to satisfy the Rule 11 requirements.202 On appeal, the
Federal Circuit explained that the defendant did not infringe any claim at issue based on
the patent disclosure, despite the plaintiff’s attempt to contradict its own patent
disclosure.203
¶92
The Federal Circuit explicitly acknowledged both the patent system’s tendency of
imposing high costs on accused infringers regardless of their liability, and how easily
NPE’s can manipulate the system because they are immune to counterclaims.204 Eon-Net
might lose some “licensing revenue should its patents be found invalid or if a court
narrowly construed the patents,” but it would not “face any business risk resulting from
the loss of patent protection over a product or process.”205 And concerning public
relations, Eon-Net would have little to lose while accused infringers faced the possibility
of being viewed as patent infringers by the public.206 Furthermore, defendants were
required to answer complaints and comply with other court proceedings, including
discovery, without any assurance of recovering litigation costs due to the American Rule.
¶93
Notwithstanding the court’s recognition of Eon-Net’s status as a patent troll, the
precedent created by Eon-Net falls short of Rule 11’s potential to prevent frivolous and
unfounded pleadings. Because the court relied on the filing of a Rule 11 motion after the
defendant had incurred significant litigation expenses (such as discovery costs), the
application of Rule 11 sanctions in this manner does little to dissuade patent trolling
generally. As discussed supra Part I, patent-trolling behavior pressures defendants to
settle before filing the infringement lawsuit because of both the uncertainty of
reimbursement for litigation costs and the threat of an injunction against ongoing
business. In addition, a Rule 11 motion is subject to Rule 11 sanctions, which adds extra
costs to filing Rule 11 motions. In sum, the delayed application of Rule 11 sanctions does
little to combat patent trolling because financially prudent and litigation-wary defendants
are nevertheless still compelled to agree either to a license fee or settlement payoff.
¶94
And although courts may openly acknowledge the legal asymmetries in patent-troll
litigation, Rule 11 sanctions must nevertheless be imposed based on objective criteria.
For instance, the Eastern District of Texas similarly acknowledged the suitability of Rule
11 sanctions for exploitative patent trolling in Raylon, LLC v. Complus Data Innovations,
200
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where a patent owner of technology for a handheld, police-ticketing device sued multiple
defendants for patent infringement. After the cases were consolidated,207 the defendants
moved for Rule 11 sanctions, as well as attorneys’ fees and legal costs for being an
exceptional case.208 The district court considered whether the arguments for damages
were not credible and if the lawsuit had been “brought only to coerce a nuisance value
settlement.”209 The district court’s Rule 11 inquiry involved analyzing “Raylon’s
damages model and early settlements to determine whether it brought its suits in good
faith or merely to obtain nuisance value settlements.”210 The court opined that “in some
situations, a plaintiff asserting a large damages model while making very low offers in
the case may indicate that the plaintiff realizes its case is very weak or even frivolous,”
and that the amount of damages may be “indicative of the good faith nature with which
the case is brought.”211 The district court concluded that Raylon’s subjective intent in
bringing the suit was not in bad faith and denied Rule 11 sanctions.212
¶95
On appeal, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s Rule 11
analysis.213 The Federal Circuit reiterated that the standard for Rule 11 is an objective
one, meaning the subjective intent of the patent infringement claimant in bringing the
lawsuit is irrelevant.214 Under Fifth Circuit precedent, “the standard under which an
attorney is measured is an objective, not subjective standard of reasonableness under the
circumstances.”215 However, the Federal Circuit still found Raylon’s proposed claim
construction to be frivolous because its argument about the pivotally mounted display
being adjustable from the viewer’s perspective instead of relative to the device housing
was such that “no reasonable litigant could reasonably expect success on the merits,” and
thus warranted Rule 11 sanctions.216
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW RULE 11 INQUISITION FOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT CLAIMANTS
¶96

Unfortunately, the current passive application of Rule 11 falls short of its potential
to shield commercially active businesses from patent trolling. The main problem with the
current application of Rule 11 is that defendants must proceed well into litigation,
expending time and money, just to get to a potentially favorable Rule 11 motion ruling.
In addition, regardless of how the litigation turns out, the PAE may repeatedly go after
other defendants, again aiming for either settlements or license fees.
¶97
However, existing civil procedure can help combat the patent-trolling problem
based on this Article’s proposed application of Rule 11, which uses a predefined, suspectclassification model to identify certain parties that assert patents in bad faith.
207

Raylon, LLC v. Complus Data Innovations, Inc., 700 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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A. Applying Rule 11 Sua Sponte: Using a Suspect Class to Combat Patent Trolling
¶98

As an equity rule, Rule 11 sanctions can be applied sua sponte, which gives the
court discretion as to the imposition of sanctions.217 This equity-driven approach has
significant advantages, such as flexibility and the potential for immediate
implementation, as opposed to legislative or administrative action. First, courts can apply
this model flexibly because no set criteria define what constitutes judicially sanctionable
conduct.218 This flexibility is especially advantageous because patent trolls can adjust
their strategies quickly to new statutes and regulations. Second, it does not require new
legislation or agency rulemaking because the legislative history and underlying policies
of Rule 11 endorse the federal judiciary’s inherent equity power.
¶99
Furthermore, a sua sponte approach moves the inquiry to an earlier stage, which
protects the commercially active defendant from expending unnecessary legal costs just
to get a chance to move for Rule 11 sanctions. The sua sponte approach can also delay
the proceedings before the defendant is even required to file an answer, further lessening
the accumulation of legal costs for the defendant. By aggressively implementing sua
sponte Rule 11 motions, courts can frontload a more stringent pleading burden on suspect
patent infringement claimants. In order to satisfy the reasonable inquiry requirements of
Rule 11, the PAE must persuade the court that its own claim construction reads on the
accused apparatus or method. Unless there is a showing of both legitimate factual and
legal grounds supporting the infringement, the defendant would not have to meet any
burden of proof until the court denies the Rule 11 motion.
¶100
In addition, courts may use Rule 11 sanctions to create preclusive-type effects or
injunctions. For instance, a court could temporarily ban the PAE from filing generic
patent infringement complaints against other defendants unless the PAE can improve the
grounds for its complaint by performing the sufficient pre-litigation investigation
required to pass Rule 11 muster.
¶101
This proposed application of Rule 11 requires courts to proactively detect
complaints filed as a part of a patent-trolling strategy. By defining a suspect class that is
predisposed to patent trolling, courts will be able to selectively apply increased scrutiny
for patent infringement assertions. Stated broadly, courts should first look to the PAE’s
complaint to determine whether this heightened scrutiny should apply. Then, when a
court identifies the PAE as a member of the suspect class, it should move sua sponte for a
Rule 11 hearing. In this hearing, the claimant is required to prove that the legal complaint
is 1) based on an independent and reasonable claim construction, and 2) supported by
sufficient facts that lead to a conclusion of infringement, or by an appropriate reason not
to include such facts.
B. Suspect-Class Factors Indicative of Bad-Faith Patent Assertion
¶102

There are many characteristics and behaviors indicative of patent trolling, as
mentioned in Part I. In order to create an easy-to-apply test, quantitatively measurable
217
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characteristics are preferable, relieving the court from having to conduct significant in
depth inquiry, while also providing a mechanism to avoid both undue delay and
unnecessary diversion of court resources.
A suspect class of patent infringement claimants can be defined by certain indicia
of patent trolling. Some easily determinable characteristics indicative of a predisposition
to patent trolling are: 1) the litigant was not in privity of employment with the named
inventor, including through subsidiaries, affiliates, or its business predecessor or
successor (leaving merely a relationship through contract originating from the transfer of
intellectual property); 2) the litigant does not make available any commercial products or
services in relation to the patent; and 3) the litigant’s lines of business for the past three
years share no commonality with the subject matter of the patent. If two or more of the
mentioned characteristics apply, the entity’s patent infringement complaint should be
subject to increased scrutiny.
These objective characteristics help a court discern whether the entity intends to use
the patented technology for the public good, or in the alternative, is relying on patents
solely as a predatory financial scheme or exploitive core-business model. In contrast,
entities offering products or services are presumed to be less likely to engage in bad-faith
patent assertion and are thus held to the traditional level of scrutiny.
Although looking directly at the conduct of the PAE most accurately identifies
patent trolling, a predisposed suspect-class approach is preferable. Discussed supra Part I,
some entities that are not patent trolls engage in patent-trolling-like conduct, and
similarly, some NPE’s have legitimate patent infringement claims. The proposed suspectclass approach triggers the specialized scrutiny even if the PAE is not a patent troll and
helps courts evaluate a claimant’s good faith on a claim-by-claim basis. Similarly, a NPE
with a legitimate assertion of patent infringement should easily pass the sua sponte Rule
11 inquiry.
As discussed previously, a patent holder may choose to send cease-and-desist
letters in bad faith where the letters offer licensing deals just below the cost of litigation
to coerce payoffs. Further, this payoff often occurs even though the patent is either
invalid or not infringed. While bargain-licensing deals for worthless patents indicate
typical patent-trolling behavior, to determine whether a patent is valid and infringed, and
that the licensing fees are reasonable, the litigation must proceed beyond the Markman
hearing stage.
But the proposed sua sponte model ameliorates this issue by frontloading the
claimant’s burden of proof. For example, during a Rule 11 motion hearing, courts inquire
into previous litigations brought by the party with regard to the same patent.219 If any of
these previous litigations proceeded to the Markman hearing stage, courts are able to
compare the claim construction in question to the precedential one. However, Rule 11
explicitly allows “a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law or for establishing new law.” While this provides leeway for a complaint
based on a frivolous construction, the purpose of the proposed sua sponte approach is to
frontload the plaintiff’s burden of proof rather than to decide Markman hearing matters
beforehand.
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See Phonometrics, Inc. v. Econ. Inns of Am., 349 F.3d 1356, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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C. Examples of Applying the Proposed Suspect-Class and Rule 11 Scrutiny Analysis
¶108

Because there are many characteristics and behaviors indicative of patent trolling, it
helps to understand this proposed implementation of Rule 11 through hypotheticals. Also,
it is important to keep in mind that Rule 11 scrutiny should be applied indiscriminately to
all NPEs, including those not often considered to be patent trolls—universities, individual
inventors, and startup businesses.
1. Increased Rule 11 Scrutiny Should Trigger for the Garden-Variety Patent Troll

¶109

This proposed application of Rule 11 should trigger scrutiny for Rule 11 sanctions
for any entity that fits the canonical features of a patent troll. If at least two of the three
predispositions of patent trolling apply, then the court should move sua sponte for a Rule
11 inquiry. However, even a true patent troll actively intending to extort a defendant and
exploit a patent can pass muster if its claim asserts objectively reasonable infringement.
This allows NPEs to assert their legal rights without imposing additional burdens, and
causes only a slight deviation in procedure.
2. Increased Rule 11 Scrutiny Should Trigger for All NPEs, but May Be Easily
Satisfied by Some

¶110

Heightened Rule 11 scrutiny should apply for any NPE not affiliated with the
inventive entity that produced the patented technology because at least two of the three
predispositions to patent trolling would be present. Increased scrutiny would not apply to
university claimants if the university invented the patented technology and developed
technologies related to the patented subject matter. Again, just as for bona fide patent
trolls, if an NPE can pass the proposed heightened Rule 11 scrutiny, legitimate claims
should avoid Rule 11 sanctions with little effort.
¶111
Imposing higher scrutiny unfortunately might slightly hinder some legitimate
claims. Take for instance a hypothetical, newly formed group of inventors that make a
breakthrough that could affect an entire industry. The group of inventors immediately
acquires a patent for this revolutionary product. But before the group can commercialize
the product, a well-funded business begins selling a suspiciously identical product.
Because the inventive group lacks funding, it is unable to commercialize the product. In
addition, the competitor’s prior litigious behavior and vast amount of financial and legal
resources make outside investors wary of funding the commercialization of the invention
and/or the patent litigation required to exclude others. Here, the inventor group’s only
option is to bring an action against the patent infringers and satisfy the reasonable inquiry
requirements. If the patent infringement claimant succeeds in the first lawsuit, other
established companies would theoretically refrain from infringing. Consequently, even
for this situation, the increased scrutiny approach would allow the NPE with a legitimate
claim of infringement to experience only a slight delay in compensation for the invention.
¶112
Importantly, this approach should trigger scrutiny for all identifiable types of
patent-trolling behavior, regardless of the entity’s status, including universities. However,
while there is no specific exception for nonprofit institutions, universities should avoid
Rule 11 sanctions with little effort. As long as the university invented the patented
technology and researched related technologies, or in the alternative, its pre-litigation
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investigation is objectively reasonable as required by Rule 11, the university will avoid
sanctions. Thus, this approach helps courts distinguish between actual patent trolling and
legitimate patent infringement lawsuits brought by universities, individual inventors, and
startup companies.
3. Increased Rule 11 Scrutiny Should Trigger for Commercially Active Entities
Engaging in Patent Trolling
¶113

This proposed application of Rule 11 should trigger scrutiny for patent-trolling
behavior equally for all claimants, regardless of the type of entity. Even commercially
active entities might attempt to assert patent claims wholly outside the scope of any of the
technologies present in their products or only tangentially related to their business. In
other words, a non-NPE can engage in patent trolling. The proposed indicia of bad-faith
patent assertion should classify these patent infringement claimants as NPEs for the
patent claims at issue, which covers technologies outside the scope of the claimant’s
current products. Then, if one of the other two remaining factors applies, the court should
move sua sponte for a higher Rule 11 scrutiny. In this way, if the patent infringement
claimant invented the technology itself or has some affiliation with the inventive entity
more than merely being an assignee in a chain of title for the patent, then the tangential or
unrelated claims can pass muster.
¶114
This aspect of the proposal is important because large, cash-laden corporations
acting as patent trolls might soon cause the most damage. In the past, the idea of mutually
assured destruction might have mitigated this threat. For example, the possibility of two
successful commercial entities wasting millions of dollars suing and countersuing each
other for patent infringement of unpracticed patents with indiscernible value deterred
companies from engaging in such conduct.220 But in principle, there is nothing in patent
law, except competition/antitrust law, that prevents the most commercially successful
companies from buying patents just to extort income from others, or worse, attempting to
gain future competitive advantages by destroying smaller companies, which thus thwarts
the development of new markets. As long as the aforementioned legal asymmetries are
present and so easily manipulated, patent trolling by these “noncompeting but
commercially active” entities does just as much harm to judicial efficiency and the
integrity of patent system as NPE-type patent trolling.221
4. Increased Rule 11 Scrutiny Should Trigger for Patent Aggregators, but May Be
Easily Satisfied by Some
¶115

By definition, patent aggregators are NPEs, but they might license various patent
rights to numerous commercially active entities. Although there is nothing particularly
unique about aggregators in this discussion, the intent of the entity asserting patent rights
is important. Instead of a deleterious, bullying tactic, an aggregator’s claim might simply
be the result of a defensive assertion aimed at protecting its licensee’s patent rights.
Importantly, the proposed analysis focuses on the legitimacy of the claim. Thus,
220

See BRIAN KAHIN & DOMINIQUE FORAY, ADVANCING KNOWLEDGE AND THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY
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aggregators will get no special treatment. However, courts should consider the claimant’s
licensing activity and any potential injury to commercially active licensees.
¶116
In addition, aggregators might use patent pools to create industry standards. This
type of behavior is economically beneficial for the public and should not create net
negative effects when those patents are asserted. Under these circumstances, even if no
one is yet actively practicing the patented technology, courts should not obstruct a
claimant from asserting a patent claim. Again, the proposed analysis focuses on the
legitimacy of the claim of patent infringement.
5. Increased Rule 11 Scrutiny Should Be Triggered by Patent Privateering, but May Be
Easily Satisfied by Some
¶117

Patent privateers originate very differently from typical patent trolls because the
original patent owner invested research into the invention with plans to practice the
technology. Then, for legal convenience, the original patent owner transfers those rights
to a closely related entity to monetize the intellectual property in order to recoup its
investment. However, despite the entity’s history, there is nothing stopping the
privateering entity from becoming a patent troll. Again, as long as the aforementioned
legal asymmetries are present and used to manipulate the patent system, the proposed
application of Rule 11 should sanction these entities for dubious claims of patent
infringement. In the future, a more nuanced analysis for the lack-of-affiliation factor
indicative of a predisposition to patent trolling in the proposed inquiry might be
necessary.
D. How Courts Could Consider Sua Sponte Rule 11 Motions for
Patent Infringement Claims

¶118

This Article proposes that whenever a court encounters a patent infringement claim
or counterclaim, it should always apply the proposed Rule 11 scrutiny based on whether a
claimant is a member of a suspect class. The evaluation could work like this:
(1) When a party files a patent infringement complaint, the court would note the
named inventor(s) and conduct a quick search of the public patent
Assignments on the Web and/or Patent Application Information Retrieval
system (PAIR), both provided by the USPTO, to find the first named
assignee and any chain of title. Because the first assignee is often an entity
involved in some relationship with the inventive entity, the first named
assignee is presumptively not a patent troll. If the first assignee is a patent
troll, then some reward has passed directly to the inventive entity.
(2) Next, the court should consider the commercial activities of the claimant by
performing a simple background search, such as by using Google, if possible,
to reveal what type of commercial operation, if any, the claimant is
conducting.

¶119

If the claimant 1) makes no products even tangentially related to the patented
technology, and 2) is not the first assignee, then a presumption of a predisposition for
patent trolling should trigger heightened Rule 11 scrutiny. However, if there has been
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more than one assignment due to a merger or acquisition, and the claimant makes no
products, courts should delay applying heightened scrutiny for a reasonable amount of
time, measured by the amount of time a reasonable company needs to develop a similar
product.
¶120
If it is determined that the claimant is a member of the suspect class, then the court
should move sua sponte for a Rule 11 hearing. Courts could use the order below as a
template.
ORDER
On _______________, _____________________ filed a patent
infringement claim against ____________________ with the Court with
regard to the U.S. Patent(s) No. ______________________________.
This Court subsequently read the public records of the United State Patent
and Trademark Office with regard to said Patent(s) revealing the first
named inventor, _______________________, and the recorded
assignments of __________________________________. As such, the
Court has concern that this lawsuit might not be grounded upon a
reasonable inquiry as required by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
¶121

This order would stay litigation until the claimant responds, thereby giving the
accused a temporary reprieve from having to defend against the claim until the claimant
passes Rule 11 scrutiny. This scrutiny requires that the claimant amend its complaint to
include 1) a plausible claim construction for each patent claim allegedly infringed, 2) the
name of the attorney who independently and professionally construed the claim(s), and 3)
sufficient facts leading to the infringement conclusion or an appropriate reason not to
include such facts. Importantly, the order need not indicate why the court triggered the
increased Rule 11 scrutiny, and the claimant may not respond to the order by arguing
why it should not be categorized as a suspect-class member. Instead, arguments may be
presented as to the indicia of patent trolling.
¶122
Because Rule 11 applies to every complaint filed by anyone, Rule 11 requirements
must be present in all filed complaints. Although the claimant bears a much lower burden
under the notice-pleading rule, the rule only applies to pleading requirements, not to prelitigation investigation. Thus, while leaving out details of factual and/or legal support in
complaints is permissible, being unable to immediately provide support in response to a
Rule 11 motion is sanctionable. Although courts might be reluctant to act sua sponte
because of both the atypical, proactive judicial effort associated with such action and the
potential embarrassment of reversal on appeal, if courts can act promptly and accurately
by identifying patent trolling suspect-class members, these concerns might fade.
E. A Parallel Sua Sponte Rule 11 Motion Approach Based on Improper Purpose:
Inquiry into Past Conduct
¶123

Sanctioning parties for using litigation for an improper purpose is an alternative to
Rule 11 sanctions for failure to perform a reasonable inquiry before filing the patent
infringement claim. Courts’ analyses for imposing Rule 11 sanctions in patent
331

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

[2014

infringement cases have focused exclusively on the soundness of infringement claims,
thereby neglecting the improper-purpose clause. Nonetheless, similar to the pre-filing
inquiry, district courts can immediately implement the improper-purpose clause
approach.
¶124
Federal courts can dismiss any complaint that shows improper purpose pursuant to
Rule 11.222 Courts may rightfully disfavor plaintiffs who use harassing tactics during
Rule 11 motion hearings, as the reasonable inquiry is not based solely on the claimant’s
investigative conduct, but also on circumstances that indicate bad faith.223 A finding of
improper purpose is very fact-specific, and thus courts should make their findings on a
case-by-case basis. In fact, courts may rely on a wealth of precedent when determining
whether certain conduct is improper under the circumstances.224
¶125
Anytime a court thinks it has encountered a patent-trolling PAE, it should move
sua sponte for increased Rule 11 scrutiny based either on the reasonableness of the prefiling inquiry or the suspicion of an improper purpose. Rule 11 gives the court the power
to subpoena. Thus, the court can require claimants to present past cease-and-desist letters
and past patent infringement complaints filed regarding the patent in the lawsuit. This
may or may not give courts reason to suspect that the plaintiff is engaging in harassing
tactics. However, it at least provides patent trolls reason to hesitate before filing a
complaint against numerous entities.
F. Goals of the Proposed Sua Sponte Applications of Rule 11 for
Bad-Faith Patent Infringement Claims
¶126

By determining the reasonableness of a pre-filing investigation prior to the answer
stage, a court can inhibit a patent troll’s ability to threaten innocent businesses with the
possibility of a temporary injunction during litigation. This would significantly disrupt
the patent troll’s business model, delaying or eliminating the forecast of large legal
expenditures and the possibility of negative public perception resulting from the
infringement accusation.
¶127
While a court cannot substantively discriminate against an entity without statutory
mandate, it may procedurally subject an entity to higher scrutiny under the same
substantive legal standard. Whereas the economic consequences of frivolous patent
litigations are in dispute, the shotgun approach and manipulative licensing offers
indisputably burden courts by overly encumbering court dockets. Both practices exhaust
judicial resources and discourage companies from seeking justice by financially
compelling them to give up without a legal fight. Therefore, by deterring entities from
threatening the filing of infringement complaints and extracting unwarranted licensing
222

See NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. at 43–44 (noting court’s inherent power to police itself).
See, e.g., Judin v. United States, 110 F.3d 780, 784 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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fees, a court can impose justice without substantively discriminating against certain
parties, such as commercially active entities.
¶128
Further, courts should not apply the increased scrutiny discriminatorily against any
specific type of business, including well known PAEs and NPEs. Rather, the criteria for
imposing increased scrutiny should focus on suppressing the type of conduct that wastes
judicial resources.
¶129
This higher scrutiny based on a suspect-classification model allows a court to
initiate a sua sponte motion at an earlier time, thus shifting the burden of proof to the
patent infringement claimant prior to when the accused infringer must file an answer. In
actual practice, however, courts have rarely initiated sua sponte motions. Thus, currently,
a realistic litigant must initiate a Rule 11 inquiry by filing a motion for Rule 11 sanctions,
and then must explain why sanctions are justified. This burden of proof makes not only
the imposition of sanctions difficult, but also gives patent trolls leverage by postponing
the sanctions to later phases of litigation. Therefore, a court-initiated motion is preferable
in solving the patent-troll problem because it allows courts to screen for abusive
pleadings prior to when the accused defendant has to take any action to defend against
the lawsuit.
¶130
In addition, because the reasonable inquiry requirements of Rule 11 must be
satisfied at the time the plaintiff files the complaint, a sua sponte Rule 11 motion can
precede the answer to the complaint, and accordingly, halt the proceeding before the
defendant is compelled to act and forced to incur legal expenses. In this way, Rule 11
sanctions can be used to pre-screen a variety of claimants before progressing into the
post-complaint stages of patent litigation where legal costs can quickly accrue for
accused infringers.
V. RULE 11 PROPOSAL TO POLICE PATENT TROLLING: TYING IT ALL TOGETHER
¶131

The goal of the proposed sua sponte Rule 11 motion is not to eliminate unlikely-tosucceed claims that otherwise may be filtered out via motions to dismiss or summary
judgments. Rather, in an attempt to deter patent trolling, the proposal time shifts judicial
scrutiny, which prevents defendants from having to incur the legal costs associated with
baseless claims of patent infringement. Under Rule 11, the independent interpretation of a
patent claim must be objectively reasonable. And as a matter of law, a frivolous claim
based on an untenable claim construction would not survive the first reasonable inquiry
requirement step. Thus, a court would dismiss the claim without prejudice regardless.225
¶132
A court can also require the claimant to show that the proposed claim construction
reads on the infringing apparatus or method. If the claimant has not conducted any
investigation followed by an infringement analysis, the court may dismiss or stay the case
until the claimant satisfies the reasonable inquiry requirements under Rule 11. Ordinarily,
PAEs need not meet this burden until after a Markman hearing, by which time the
defendants must have already expended significant legal costs in producing and
supporting their own claim constructions and appearing before the court.

225

FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
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¶133

Furthermore, because contingency-fee lawyers, who prefer quick settlements, direct
many patent-trolling lawsuits,226 an ex parte Rule 11 hearing at the onset of litigation
should further deter patent trolling. In other words, fewer incentives for patent-trolling
lawyers lead to fewer patent trolls in practice.
¶134
However, courts should be cautious not to overly burden claimants’ access to
discovery because some infringement claims inevitably need to resort to factual
investigation. For example, even a dyed-in-the-wool patent troll may properly cease their
factual inquiry if obtaining the infringing apparatus or its equivalent is unfairly
burdensome. Under these circumstances, usually dealing with complex technology or
some other reasonable difficulty, courts should use discretion and allow at least limited
discovery. Simply stated, some lawsuits brought by bona fide patent trolls may have
legitimate infringement claims that courts should not deny based merely on the asserting
entity’s otherwise predatory business model.
VI. CONCLUSION
¶135

While nuisance lawsuits are not new, the substantial economic drag created by
patent trolling makes these lawsuits particularly damaging in an increasingly
technological society. The patent-trolling problem can generally be defined as the
practice of attempting to monetize low quality, excessively broad patents solely via
patent infringement litigation or threats thereof. Unfortunately, all of this comes at the
expense of innovative entities active in commerce, consumers, and society as a whole.
¶136
Patent trolling distorts the underlying purpose of the patent system. The most
lucrative patents for patent trolling are not aligned with the most publically beneficial
disclosures of technology. Rather, patent trolls select patents that maximize their rentseeking behavior. Because patents chosen for patent trolling are often unreasonably broad
or vague, relate to business methods, or represent proxies for wealthy and/or volume
infringers, the potential benefits of patent trolling are out of balance with technological
advancement, which creates an inherent conflict with the patent system’s constitutional
mandate. In other words, patent trolling’s deleterious impact outweighs any benefits of
liquidity and remuneration to individual inventors, universities, and startups. In fact, the
continued success of patent trolls further incents the acquisition of vague and overbroad
patent claims.
¶137
This Article delineates criteria to help courts identify certain entities that are
predisposed to bad-faith patent trolling. Courts are encouraged to impose higher scrutiny
at an earlier stage of litigation whenever a “suspect class” asserts a patent claim in an
effort to screen out bad-faith actors before legal costs start piling up on accused
infringers. Requiring some suspect infringement claimants to show that their claim
constructions and infringement analyses reasonably read on the infringed apparatuses or
methods before entering the Markman hearing stage would not create any new burdens
for parties; the burden on the claimant is only time shifted, not increased. Frontloading
the plaintiff’s burden should significantly deter patent trolling and protect some accused
infringers from frivolous claims by members of the suspect class.
226
See Lisa Shuchman, One Year in, a Look at New Ways to Challenge Patents, CORP. COUNSEL (Oct.
11, 2013), http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202623095271&slreturn=201311
30212107.
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A new rule may sometimes inconvenience those it is designed to help. Litigation is
often prohibitively expensive for NPEs, some of which are individual inventors or small
startups with limited resources. Having to satisfy the higher scrutiny proposed in this
Article might sometimes require additional effort for NPEs asserting patent rights in good
faith. Introducing a loser-pays, fee-shifting system, however, would greatly burden all
good-faith NPEs wishing to assert their patent rights with the potentially catastrophic risk
of not only losing the lawsuit, but also having to pay the opposition’s costs. In addition,
Rule 11 sanctions are available notwithstanding the absence of an identifiable nonprevailing party, such as when parties settle litigation out of court.
Society already provides patent holders the legal right to collect “toll” fees for
which patent trolls take advantage. One could argue that this time-honored legal
arrangement indicates a societal belief that such fees are an essential part of the patent
system. Similarly, changing the rules, especially those concerning longstanding
ownership rights, may cause many to fear that more harm than good will result from such
a change. After all, it is intrinsically unfair to punish someone who relied on clear legal
rights when deciding to expend resources and adopt a legally sanctioned business model,
including models that never practice patents, provide services, or sell products.
The patent system rests on the idea that a patent is presumptively valid and
enforceable in order to promote progress and technological innovation. But when a patent
troll enforces or threatens to enforce a patent, its focus is on exploiting the realities of
patent litigation to obtain a quick payoff. Still, this might not be economically wasteful
rent seeking because an inventor, at some point, did in fact put forth the effort to create
the patented invention. While the government grants patent rights for the public good,
society and the law cannot categorically ban patent trolling simply because the patented
technology benefits society. After all, when societal demand is high for a certain product,
the temptation to infringe that product’s patent naturally corresponds.227 Otherwise, for
example, if patents rights were easily extinguished, investment for research and
development of many pharmaceutical drugs would likely never occur. Similarly, many of
the various legislative proposals mentioned supra Part II might unintentionally weaken
the enforcement of non-frivolous patent infringement claims and/or diminish
remuneration to individual inventors, failed startup companies, and universities that
might have otherwise promoted the original inventive activities and necessary risk taking.
What can society do about the patent-trolling problem? No one would support
destroying a useful bridge to stop trolls from robbing travelers that cross the bridge.
Similarly, and more realistically, courts should not support extortionary conduct by
denying defendants an easier way to escape untenable patent infringement claims. A
patent purchaser may commercialize the technology, engage in patent trolling, or turn
around and sell it. Only the choice to engage in patent trolling should trigger further
scrutiny into the claimant’s intent, and as explained in this Article, courts should apply
this scrutiny regardless of an entity’s status or commercial attributes.
This Article posits that an increased and systemic use of sua sponte Rule 11
motions could punish patent trolls for bringing exploitative lawsuits and thus deter
patent-trolling behavior in general. The drafters of Rule 11 provided built-in judicial
discretion for sua sponte motions that allows for a flexible rule based on equitable
227

See supra notes 62–73 and accompanying text.
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factors, as opposed to a compulsory sanction for those ambiguously defined as patent
trolls. The flexible nuances of judicial discretion allow for an approach that is better
equipped to handle unique patent-trolling behavior, the evolving exploitation of legal
inefficiencies, and most importantly, the difficulty in defining a patent troll in statutory
language, which could easily be gamed.228 Instead of merely categorizing entities by
commercial characteristics or NPE status, justifiable sanctions will inevitably result if
courts use objective indicia as a readily discernible proxy for an NPE’s subjective intent
behind filing a claim.
Admittedly, this approach might prompt courts to subject good-faith claimants to
Rule 11 hearings. Alternatively, the increased prevalence of Rule 11 sanctions might
discourage some claimants from filing meritorious complaints due to the uncertainty of
whether they have met the Rule 11 requirements. Ultimately, though, this approach can
provide equitable results if courts proactively initiate Rule 11 hearings because extended
litigation costs far more than increased scrutiny. This cost differential affects not only
parties to the litigation, but society as a whole.
Patent trolls impede technological development and commercialization just as
mythical trolls hinder travel and increase its cost. If it would cost more to remove the
trolls from under the bridge, as opposed to simply paying the troll-toll fees, no one would
individually choose to remove the trolls. Patent trolls demand license fees that are too
small to justify expending even preliminary litigation costs to prove the illegitimacy of
the claim. Thus, currently, defendants have little incentive to fight the troll and drive it
away from the bridge. Hopefully, though, the judiciary can exercise its inherent powers
and join the melee to easily shield defendants from incurring legal costs until the patent
infringement claimant can pass scrutiny.
More broadly, the very existence of a quick and cheap “off-ramp” prior to the
answer stage during patent litigation can significantly deter patent trolling. 229 Rule 11
provides a safe harbor for defendants to escape patent infringement lawsuits at the
earliest time possible, avoiding legal expenses by obtaining a complaint dismissal. “If a
troll knows he can no longer trap a defendant in expensive and lengthy litigation, his
interest in the suit will diminish substantially,” and the amount of the payoff that can
reasonably be demanded will decrease.230
Ultimately, former Chief Judge Rader said it best:
The onslaught of litigation brought by “patent trolls” . . . has
slowed the development of new products, increased costs for businesses
and consumers, and clogged our judicial system.
....

228

See Hearing on H.R. 3309 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (testimony of
David Kappos, Former Director, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office), available at http://judiciary.house.
gov/_files/hearings/113th/10292013/Kappos%20Testimony.pdf (“[C]onsideration should be given to
reducing prescription to a minimum, and tasking the judiciary with the detailed work needed to turn broad
legislative guidance into properly calibrated court procedure.”).
229
See Charles E. Schumer, A Strategy for Combating Patent Trolls, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323844804578531021238656366.
230
Id.
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Lost in the debate, however, is that judges already have the
authority to curtail these practices: they can make trolls pay for abusive
litigation.
....
Judges know the routine all too well, and the law gives them the
authority to stop it. We urge them to do so.231

231

Rader Op-Ed., supra note 2.
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